

1968/9

SE
N.
U.

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.
R. P. O'Connell
Date 4/11/70

YEAR
STAMP

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT.
NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. **NE Q 10/2** (Part A) (1-70)

TITLE: *Sale of Military Equipment
to the Iraqi Government:*

W
18

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

A
PART

FILE No. **NE Q 10/2**

| REFER TO | | | REFER TO | | | REFER TO | | |
|------------------------------------|------------|-------|------------------------------------|------------|------|------------------------------------|------------|------|
| NAME (and dept. when necessary) | TO SEE: | DATE | NAME (and dept. when necessary) | TO SEE: | DATE | NAME (and dept. when necessary) | TO SEE: | DATE |
| D. J. M. | 1-2 | 6/11 | Registry | | 20/2 | P. H. | | 15/4 |
| Registry | | 6/11 | P. H. | | 20/2 | Regy | | 17/4 |
| D. J. M. | 4 | 8/11 | Registry | | 27/2 | P. H. | 50 | 24/4 |
| Regy | | | P. H. | | | Regy | | 24/4 |
| DT. SD. | 5 | | Regy | | 27/3 | P. H. | 51 | 25/4 |
| Reg. | | 9/12 | P. H. | | 10/3 | Reg. | | 6/5 |
| D. J. M. | | 9/12 | Regy | | 17/3 | P. H. | | 6/5 |
| Regy | | 20/12 | P. H. | | 18/3 | Regy | | 13/5 |
| D. J. M. | 12 | 20/12 | Regy (S. J. S.) | | | P. H. | 56 | 17/5 |
| Reg. | | 21/1 | Reg. | | 19/3 | Regy | | 16/5 |
| D. J. M. | 13 | 21/1 | P. H. | | 19/3 | P. H. | | 21/5 |
| Reg. | | 24/1 | Reg. | | 24/3 | Regy | | 28/5 |
| D. T. S. D. (S. J. S.) | 15 | 28/1 | P. H. | 38 | 25/3 | P. H. | 68 | 28/5 |
| D. J. M. | 21, 22 | 28/1 | Regy | 38 | 26/3 | Regy | | 10/6 |
| Regy | | 30/1 | P. H. | 39, 40 | 20/1 | P. H. | | 13/6 |
| D. J. M. | 23 | | Regy | | 8/4 | | | |
| DTSD | | 12/2 | P. H. | | 8/4 | | | |
| Reg | | 12/2 | Regy | | 11/4 | | | |
| PRM | 24/25 | 17/2 | A.A.A. | | 14/4 | | | |

Registry Address

Room No. 115,
F.O. Building,
Downing Street.

SECURITY GRADING

N.B.
UP

YEAR STAMP

1968/9

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361

28 OCTOBER 1968



CONFIDENTIAL.

MY TELEGRAM NO 304: — EQ 10/3

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ.

GENERAL TAKRITI TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS SEND
ING A THREE-MAN DELEGATION TO U.K. TO SEE WHAT
ARMOURED CARS, NEW OR SECOND HAND, WERE AVAILABLE
FOR IMMEDIATE PURCHASE. IF THEY REPORTED
THAT THEY HAD FOUND WHAT WAS WANTED, HE WOULD AUTHORISE
THEM TO BUY RIGHT AWAY.
THEY WOULD BE LEAVING IMMEDIATELY. —

They arrived six days
later! jmr

2. GENERAL TAKRITI SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD IF THEY COULD
BE GIVEN ALL POSSIBLE HELP. THEY COULD BE CONTACTED THROUGH
THE MILITARY ATTACHE AT THE IRAQ EMBASSY. PERHAPS MY
MILITARY ATTACHE DESIGNATE, COLONEL SHARPE COULD ARRANGE
TO SEE THEM AT SOME POINTS?

3. THEIR NAMES ARE GIVEN IN MY IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
D.T. & S.D.
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
NORTH AFRICAN DEPT.
UNITED NATIONS DEPT.
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
NEWS DEPT.
SOUTH ASIAN DEPT.

DIS MOD

Copied to Lt Col Smith
2102, 100)

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY



CONFIDENTIAL

CYF OR/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 362

28 OCTOBER 1968

1. 1/11

CONFIDENTIAL.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

COLONEL ABDUL JAWAD AL ' LAWAND

COLONEL ABDUL RAZZAK AL ' NAJAFI

CAPTAIN SALEEM AL ' IMAMI

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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*Copied to Lt Col Smith
DI 22 1101*

TOP SECRET

| |
|------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN |
| ARCHIVES No. 56 |
| 4 NOV 1968 |
| NEA 1072 |
| 1 NOVEMBER 1968 (DTSD) |

(3)

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 388

TO BAGHDAD
1 NOVEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR TELEGRAM 361. MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ.

WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND OUT WHEN THE DELEGATION IS ARRIVING BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE WE INTEND TO POSTPONE SHARPE'S DEPARTURE SO THAT HE CAN MAKE CONTACT WITH THE DELEGATION ON THEIR ARRIVAL HERE. WE WILL NOTIFY SHARPE'S AMENDED DATE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL IN BAGHDAD SEPARATELY.

2. FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS WE ACCEPT THAT SHARPE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE ASSUMED DUTY AS YOUR M.A. WITH EFFECT FROM THE DATE OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION IN THIS COUNTRY.

STEWART

F I L E S

D.T. & S.D.
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

Registry No.
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
Unclassified

Flash
Immediate
~~Priority~~
Routine

(Date) _____
Dispatched _____
CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Ex Clair.
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. _____ (date) 14 Nov 1968

And to _____

repeated for information to _____

Saving to _____

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD 388

(Date) 1/11

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

FILES

DTSD

Near Eastern Dept

Copies to:—

Ministry of Defense:—

71 4

71 22

73 23

2 Sales (Army)

Your telegram 3610 Military equipment
for Iraq

We have not yet been able to find out when
the delegation is arriving but subject to your
concurrence we intend to postpone Sharpe's
departure so that he can make contact with the
delegation on their arrival ^{here} in this country. We will
notify Sharpe's amended date and time of arrival in
Baghdad separately.

2. For administrative reasons we accept that
Sharpe should be considered to have assumed duty
as your M.A. with effect from the date of the arrival
of the Iraqi delegation in this country. E.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

1487
M13
14207
7/11/68

TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S
Communications Department

D.T. & S.D.

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

388 To Baghdad (1/1)

TO:

Head of D. 1. 4 My Defence (Main body)

" " D. 1. 22 " " "

" " D. S. 13. " " "

" " D. Sales (Army) My Defence
(St. Christopher House)

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department:

(Initials) (Date) 4/11

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION

WF 14 (24)

RR HUPLE

DE HUPHL

R 060700Z

FM ASOLKS NR 754

TO RR ASOLHY 39506

GRS 12

BT

YOUR TELNO 388.1 CONCUR. DELEGATION LEFT ON 3 NOVEMBER.


Mr. EVANS

BT

GRS 12

~~CCN WA ASOLKS NR 754~~

NNNN



sup D TSD

BAHIDAD
Wm 395
6/11

3 [Military equipment for Iraq]

p.a.
Jm 8/11

Index up + 15

Def. Training &
Supply Dept

Nr. Eastern Dept

1
8
1/12 Balc
1/12 23
3/12 1
2/12 1



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

5

01-928 7999 Extn. 4237

Our ref A/10/Clearances/1778

7th November 1968


Dear David

Minute

for. Jm 27

At a recent meeting with Iraqi officers at present visiting this country Brig. Warburg, MA/OE, was given the undermentioned list of items required by Iraq.

- 120 Ferret Scout Cars (new or reconditioned)
- 100 Heavy recovery vehicles
- 140 10 ton cargo vehicles
- 45 Tank transporters
- Petrol bowzers
- 30 Water tankers
- Mule transporters
- Refrigerated lorries
- Ambulances



In a letter to Whitby in the Board of Trade dated 18th September 1968 you raised no objections to the supply of tank transporters. I should be grateful for your views on the supply of the other items.

Yours sincerely,

E 10/14 (9)

Ken Nutting

D.J.S. Murray, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy to C.G. Warman, Esq., M.O.D. DS 13b



DTSD:msz
Please BU to
the Ministry
21/11
7.9/22

Our reference: HU/328/05
 Your reference:


MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR2c3,

Castlewood House, 77-81 New Oxford Street,

London W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex
 Telephone: 01-2638 3644, ext. 229



November, 1968.

We have received notice of a requirement for VHF manpack equipment in Iraq and a request for the supply of equipment for evaluation. It is not yet known which equipment would be most suited to meet this requirement but in order to save time later once clarification has been received I am writing to seek your views on the matter.

For this purpose I am assuming that something like A41 or Mitre-type equipment (Cub and Bantam) will be required. I will let you know when the specific equipments can be identified.

As you will recall, at the AWP meeting on 3rd January 1967, you informed the meeting of the lifting of the embargo on the supply of man-pack radios to Iraq and I now seek your confirmation that this remains your policy, and specifically whether you have objections to the demonstration and possible supply of VHF manpacks to this country.

I am sending copies of this letter to other AWP members who are invited to comment on the proposal.

K. A. PLANT

R. Brown Esq.,
 Sales Division,
 M.O.D. (Army)
 St. Christopher House,
 Southwark Street,
 London, S.E.1.

Man-Eating Duff (Mr. M. S. S.)

Do you see any objection.

None. Done 29/11

X X

DT & SD

Copies to:- D. J. S. Murray, Esq. (Foreign Office)
J. A. Patterson, Esq. (Treasury)
S. P. Bourne, Esq. (D.E.A.)
D. Church, Esq. (B.O.T.)
Miss J. E. Stevens. (B.O.T.)
O. J. Porter, Esq., (M.O.D.)
Miss L. B. Cramer, (M.O.D. Navy)
G. Barry, Esq. (M.O.D. Air)
L. Savigar, Esq. (Mintech)

7

NEQ 10/2

22 November 1968.

31 ER 10/14

Please refer to your letter
A/10/Clearances/792 of 23 September 1968.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
have no objection to the supply to Iraq of
40 Saracen wheeled armoured personnel carriers.

D. J. S. Murray

(D. J. S. Murray) (on leave).

A. Miller Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

Copy to: C. G. Warner Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Mr. Makinson,
Near Eastern Dept.

DRAFT

21 NOV 1968

)

A. Miller, Esq.,

~~J. L. Waikley, Esq.,~~

~~K. W. Nutting, Esq.,~~

Sales 5b(A)
MOD.

Copy: *Warman Esq.*
~~C. G. Farnsworth~~
Miss F. Farnsworth,
D.S.13(c) MCD.

Mr. Makin
M.C.I.
Just

Please ~~would you~~ refer to
your letter A/10/Clearances/772
of 23 September 1968

2. The ~~F~~CO ^{have} would ~~have~~ no


objection to the supply to

Iraq of 40 *Savannah*
wheeled armored personnel
carrier.

Mr. Makinson - Near Eastern Department

Arms for Iraq

The delegation of Iraqi officers at present visiting this country met Brigadier Warburg of Defence Sales on 5 November. I attach a letter from Mr. Nutting which gives a list of the items in which they expressed interest. None of them seem to be inadmissible in the light of current policy, being mostly administrative vehicles. As Mr. Nutting points out, we have already approved the supply of tank transporters and I would be grateful for your views on the supply of the other items.



(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training and Supply Department
13 November, 1968.

L Murray D.T.S.D.

I see no objection

Phalindan 19/11

MS23
PTFS.

JR 21/11

P.R. 18/11 22/11

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER EW 041335Z

5 DECEMBER 1968

File R. 12

⑧

Jan 5/12

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
- 6 DEC 1966
NEQ 10/2

Distributed to
M.C.D. (S)
Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Policy Dept.
Training & Control Dept.
Ind. of P. & M. S.

Reg
Copy for S.S.D
Copy for D.J.M

Mr. Easter Dist. ✓
Hd. of Comm. Dept.
Examines
File: Distribution Selectors.
Inform Registrar.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR MOD ARMY R F I MINTECH

FOR D SALES ARMY. EW 041335ZDEC68.

FOLLOWING FOR NIESSEN FROM DEFAT BAGHDAD. SALE OF SARACENS.
YOUR A/219/OVERSEAS/51 OF 1 OCTOBER 1968, TO IRAQI
MILAT LONDON. HAVE BEEN TOLD BY IRAQI MOD THAT THEY WANT THESE
FOURTY VEHICLES AND MORE IF OFFERED. THEY ALSO REQUIRE RADIO
FOR THEM WHICH SHOULD BE PRIMARILY H F. SUGGESTED TO THEM
THIRTY FIVE WITH C13/B47 ^{HARNESS} ~~274,377~~ AND FIVE WITH C13/C42/B47.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE NOT CONSIDERED RADIO PROBLEM VERY
CAREFULLY AND ANY SIMILAR SOLUTION BASED PRIMARILY ON H F WOULD
PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED. THEY ALSO REQUEST SOME DISCOUNT ON BOTH

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



~~GOINT~~ ~~CHUBB~~

VEHICLES AND

SETS BUT I BELIEVE THAT THIS NEED NOT BE LARGE IF WE CAN OFFER
EARLY DELIVERY. PLEASE SIGNAL YOUR REACTIONS URGENTLY.

F C O PLEASE PASS MINTECH

SENT TO D.C.C. AND MINTECH

M. EVANS

SENT AT 0700Z/05 DEC




From K.W. Nutting Sales 5b(A)

Enter place *6/12*
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928-7999 Ext 4237



Our Reference: A/10/Clearances/1744

5 December 1968

(6)
Please refer to your letter HU/328/05 of 14th November 1968 about the supply of manpack radios to Iraq.

I am able to confirm that it is no longer the policy of the Army Department to embargo the supply of man portable radios to Iraq. We do not, however, wish this to be taken as giving 'blanket' approval to the supply of such radios. We should therefore be grateful if you will let us know what particular radios it is proposed to demonstrate and possibly supply to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

K.W. Nutting

K.A. Plant Esq
Ministry of Technology EIR203

Copies for information to:

C. G. Warman Esq
C.A. Alldis Esq
D.J.S. Murray Esq
L.A. Savigar Esq
D.E. Church Esq
Miss J.E. Stevens
R.E. Adams Esq
J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS 13(b)
Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
Foreign Office, DT & SD
Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
Board of Trade, (XP)
Board of Trade, (ELB)
H.M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

(HE Q 10/2)

10 December, 1968

6
Please refer to your letter HU/328/05 of 14 November 1968 about the Iraq requirement for VHF manpack radio equipment.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no objection to the supply of this type of radio equipment to Iraq. We would, however, wish to be kept informed about the progress of negotiations.

3. I am copying this letter to those A.W.P. members who received yours.

(D. J. S. Murray)
DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

K. A. Plant, Esq.,
EIR 203,
Ministry of Technology,
Castlewood House,
LONDON, W.C.1.

o/p 11/12

copies: J. A. Patterson - Treasury
S. P. Bourne - (DEA)
D. Church - (B. of T.)
Miss J. E. Stevens (B. of T.)
O. J. Porter, - (M. of Defence)
Miss L. B. Craner - (M. of Defence)
G. Barry - (M.O.D. Air)
L. Savigar - (Min. of Technology)

Registry No. HE 410/2

DRAFT letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

4/12

To:—

K.A. Plant, Esq.,
Whitchurch EIR 2c3

From

D.S.S. Murran

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Mr. M. A. B. Jones
New Castle Dept.

First.

cc.

S.A. Paterson Esq
H.M. Treasury
S.P. Bourne Esq
D.E.A.

D.E. Church Esq
X.P. Brand B.I.T.
Min S.E. Stevens,
E.L.B. B.I.T.

O.T. Porter Esq
D.S. 13 h M.D.

Min L.B. Cray
Sales (M) M.D.

L. J. Savage Esq
EIR 101 Whitchurch

C.G. Warran Esq
D.S. 13 M.D.

Please refer to your letter HU/328/05/104
November 1968 about the Iraq requirement for
VHF man pack and radio equipment.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
has no objection to the supply of this type of radio
equipment to Iraq. We will, however, wish to be kept informed
about the progress of negotiations.

I am replying to this letter to those A.W.P. members
who received yours.

W. J. 6/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPT.





(NE Q 10/2)

9 December, 1968



Please refer to your letter
A/10/Clearances/1778 of 7 November,
1968.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office would have no objection to the
supply to Iraq of the vehicles listed
in your letter.

 9/12/68

(D. J. S. Murray)
DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPT.

K. W. Nutting, Esq.,
Sales Sb(A),
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building.

c.c. C. G. Warman, Esq.,
D.S.13(e), M.O.D.

DRAFT

QHE 4 (5/2)

~~A. Miller, Esq.,~~

~~J. L. Waikley, Esq.,~~

K. W. Nutting, Esq.,

Sales 5b(A)
MOD.

Please ~~would you~~ refer to

your letter A/10/Clearances/1778

of 7 March 1968

2. The FO/CO would have no

objection to the supply to

Copy:

~~C. G. Warman Esq.~~
~~Miss F. Farnsworth,~~
D.S.13(c) MOD.

of the vehicles
listed in your letter.

WJH
9/12

SM
5/12.

CONFIDENTIAL

12

CYPHER/CAT A

BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELNO OYT 181545Z

19 DECEMBER, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY



OYT 18 1545Z DEC 68. FOR PLANT EIR2C3 FROM
DEFAT BAGHDAD. REF MY DA/601 OF 6 DEC ABOUT MAN-
PACK RADIO. SINCE WRITING I HAVE DISCUSSED
REQUIREMENT WITH STAFF OFFICER IN
OPERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH PURCHASES.
HE REJECTS BOTH A13 AND A41 AS TOO
BIG AND OF PERFORMANCE ABOVE WHAT IS REQUIRED. VERY.
LIGHT HAND SET WITH RANGE OF ONE TO THREE MILES IS
WANTED. SAID MOST SUITABLE SEEN SO FAR WAS
GERMAN BUILT SET OF AMERICAN PATTERN BUT
DID NOT GIVE NAME. PLEASE FORWARD URGENTLY DETAILS INCL-
UDING PRICE AND DELIVERY DATES OF PYE POCKET PHONE AND SIMILAR
SETS. REQUIREMENT WILL BE FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED.

MR. EVANS

[COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (CASTLEWOOD)]

FILES
NEAR EASTERN DEPT
D.T.S.D.
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT
MILITARY ADVISER

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

E.I.R.2c3,

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street
LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex
Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext. 229

Our reference: HU/328/05

Your reference: A/10/Clearances/1744-9

12 December, 1968

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 56 31 DEC 1968 NEQ 10/2 |
|---|

Dear Mr. Nutting,

I am now able to give further information on what type of equipment we wish to demonstrate to the Iraqi MOD.

The requirement could be met by the A41 VHF manpack and I should therefore be grateful of your specific approval for the supply of this equipment for evaluation and possible eventual supply to Iraq.

Information copies go to other AWP members.

Yours sincerely,
K.A. Plant
K.A. PLANT

K.W. Nutting Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
London, S.E.1.

Mr. Murray
DT & SD
etc.

Information copies to

✓ D.J.S. Murry Esq.,
J.A. Patterson Esq.,
S.P. Bourne Esq.,
D. Church Esq.,
Miss J.E. Stevens
O.J. Porter, Esq.,
Miss L.B. Cramer
G. Barry Esq.,
L. Savigar Esq.

F & C.O. equipment,
Treasury
DEA
BOT (XP)
BOT (ELB)
MOD DS13
MOD Navy
MOD (Air)
Mintech (EIR)

MB


7/1

I see no objection to the supply of this

New Eastern Dept.

(14)

OUT TO BAGHDAD TEL NO 231508 OF 24/12 FM MOD ARMY UNIT 7 LARCOMBE
CYPHER CAT A



CONFIDENTIAL.

**FOLLOWING FOR MILITARY ATTACHE FROM MOD ARMY TEL NO OYT 231508+Z DEC.
FROM SALES 2B(A)**

YOUR OYQ 180955Z REFERS. FERRETS AND SARACENS.

- 1. WE ARE CONSULTING FIRMS FOR CREDIT TERMS AND WILL REFER TO
THESE IN OFFER. CREDIT WOULD NORMALLY BE FIRM TO GOVERNMENT.**
- 2. IN MEANTIME GRATEFUL TO LEARN TO WHOM OFFER SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
AND HOW MANY YEARS CREDIT THEY MAY WANT FOR SARACENS AND FOR NEW
FERRETS.**

DT&SD ✓
Sp4 1003
7/1
9/1

15

PRIORITY

STOW UNNUMBERED


SENT 8.1.69

TO: PRODRONE BAGHDAD

FOR: MILITARY ATTACHE

FROM: MINTECH KIR 2(C) LONDON

CO. IDENTIAL



res -
9/1
pa. Jm 13/1

FOR MILITARY ATTACHE FROM COATES E.I.R.2(C).
MORTAR LOCATING RADARS.

1. REFERENCE KIR2(C)3 LETTER OF 8TH NOVEMBER ABOUT CYMBELINE.
 2. MIIR IED HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY LAWRENCE DE SOUZA WHO STATES IRAQ HAS AN IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT FOR 25-50 MORTAR LOCATING RADARS. DE SOUZA ALLEGES IRAQ IS PREPARED TO GUARANTEE PAYMENT BY IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT BUT STRESSES URGENCY OF DELIVERY WHICH MUST COMMENCE IN 2 YARS FROM DATE OF CONTRACT. ORDER FOR 50 EQUIPMENTS WITH SPARES WOULD BE WORTH £5-6M.
 3. DE SOUZA IS A FRONT MAN AND CLAIMS TO HAVE INFLUENTIAL CONNECTIONS WITH HIGH UP ARMY OFFICERS AND ALSO OFFICIALS. DE SOUZA STATES ANY CONTRACT WOULD BE NEGOTIATED BY MIIR WITH IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON.
 4. DE SOUZA IS UNKNOWN TO US. WE ARE CHECKING. HE HAS PROVIDED GOOD REFERENCES AND STATES HE WAS FORMERLY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, BABOON STREET, BAGHDAD.
 5. FOR PRODUCTION AND SECURITY REASONS WE CANNOT SUPPLY CYMBELINE IN THE REQUIRED TIMESCALE. DE SOUZA SAYS IRAQ GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE GREEN ARCHER MK.1 TO MEET IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT. SUPPLY OF GREEN ARCHER MK.1 WOULD INVOLVE REOPENING PRODUCTION LINE WHICH MIIR ARE PREPARED TO DO. I AM CHECKING OTHER DEPARTMENTS VIEWS ON RELEASE OF INFORMATION AND SUPPLY.
- GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE IRAQI REQUIREMENT FOR LOCATING RADARS AND ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE ON DE SOUZA.

ORIG:- KIR 2(C)

INFO:- US/KIR

AS/KIR2

F.O./DT & SD)

F.O. (EASTERN DEPT,)

GS(OR)1G (BRIGADIER SHERMAN)

FILE NO:- HU/322/07

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

(16)

Mr. Makinson - Near Eastern Dept.

Mortar Locating Radars

(15)

I have seen Baghdad telegram STOW un-numbered of 8 January about a possible Iraq interest in mortar locating radars.

2. Paragraph 5 refers to the Green Archer MK.1 mortar locator. This is a British equipment in service with the British Army and is of the first generation. It will in time be replaced by Cymbeline and one would have presumed that our interest would have lain in selling ex-British Army radars. In this case, however, E.M.I.E. are apparently prepared to re-open the production line.

3. Although Green Archer is not a lethal weapon in itself, it is extremely effective and is essential for counter-mortar work, in that it provides data which enables the mortar to be located and then engaged with artillery or mortar fire or by aircraft. It would therefore be of value in operations against dissidents who might have obtained this type of weapon. It could also, of course, be used against the more formally organised armed forces, such as those of Kuwait.

4. Perhaps you would let me know if there is any other information which might be helpful.

D. J. S. Murray

(D. J. S. Murray)
10 January, 1969

DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

*Hi Murray 3.2.69. That's it.
We are prepared to supply
more sophisticated radar &
more sophisticated weapons.
I do not think we could
logically object to this, if
a request were made.
Jhr 13/*

CONFIDENTIAL

pa Jhr 16/1

17

NEQ 10/2

dup 15 January, 1969

13

Please refer to your letter HU/328/05 of 18 December 1968 to Mr. Nutting of Sales 5b(A) about the demonstration to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence of A41 VHF manpack radios.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no objection either to the demonstration of this radio to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, or to eventual supply should an order be received.

I am copying this letter to A.W.P. members.

(D. J. S. MURRAY)

K. A. Plant, Esq.,
EIR 2c3,
Ministry of Technology,
Castlewood House,
77-91 New Oxford Street,
London, W.C.1.

Registry No. *NEQ 15/2*

DRAFT *letter*

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified. *2 2/1*

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

*K. A. Plant, Esq.,
EIR 2 c 3*

White

M.

From

J. T. S. Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

J.T.S.D.

113 JAN 1969

Mr. Beamish 14/5/71

First. 10/1

cc.

A. W. P. Mather.

Please refer to your letter HU/28/05 1/18
December 1968 & Mr. Muthing of School 56(2)
about the demonstration & the Iraqi Ministry
of Defense of Adh VHF in an park radius.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no
^{either} objection to the demonstration of this radio & the
Iraqi M.O., ~~not~~ or & eventual supply should an
order be received.

I am copying this letter to A.W.P. Mather.

[Signature]
15/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

c.c. D.J.S. Murray, Esq. (F.O.)

EXPORT LICENSING BRANCH

18

ELB 1426/P

7221



1 January, 1969.

Dear Mr. Tallboys,

Following the recent correspondence about C.S. gas, you will want to know that Schermuly have now written to us enquiring about the possibility of licences being granted should an order materialise from Iraq. Schermuly seem to think that there is a chance of an enquiry being received from that country and are already in touch with Ministry of Defence (Army Dept.) regarding clearance to supply Iraq.

I should be grateful for your views on this enquiry also those of Mr. Murray (F.O.) Mr. Church (B.O.T. (XP)) and Mr. Brown (M.O.D. (Army)) to whom I am copying this letter.

Yours sincerely,

J.E. Stevens (Miss)

M.H. Tallboys, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

Mr. Makinson, (Near Eastern Department, W.133)

I attach a copy of Export Licensing Branch letter ELB 1426/P of 1 January, 1969 about the possible export of C.S. gas to Iraq.

2. We have already approved the export of this gas to several Commonwealth and NATO countries and Ministerial approval has just been given to an export to the USA. I presume that you foresee no objection in the case of Iraq and I attach a draft to that effect.

D. J. S. Murray

(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training and
Supply Department
E MS24, Tel. MB1488
3 January, 1969

L. Appleyard.

I am not sure. The Israelis could make great play with this. What are your views?

J. Halimdon
13/1

Purely from the point of view of Israeli reactions, I do not think we can object to the sale. I expect that the gas will be used, if supplied, against Iraqis rather than Israelis.

L. Appleyard 13/1

Mr. Makinson.

W. Murray DTSD

Then I agree.

Draft & in a

15/1

14/1

MO 19/2

19.

20 January, 1969.

21/1/69

18

Please refer to your letter HM 1426/P of 1 January, 1969 about a possible export of C.I. gas to Iraq.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no objection on political grounds to the supply of this chemical to Iraq. We would be glad, however, if you could please keep us informed of the state of negotiations between the firm and the Iraqi authorities.

(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training & Supply Department

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Export Licensing Branch,
HOME OFFICE,
Millgate House,
25 Old Bailey,
E.C.4.

Registry No. *NEQ 10/2*

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Export Licensing Branch,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey, E.C.4.

From

D. J. S. Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Defence Training and
Supply

PRIVACY MARKING

_____ In Confidence

15
Mr. W. J. S. Murray
H.E.D.

Just.

Please refer to your letter ELB 1426/P of 1 January, 1969 about a possible export of C.S. gas to Iraq.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no objection on political grounds to the supply of this chemical to Iraq. We would be glad, however, if you could please keep us informed of the state of negotiations between the firm and the Iraqi authorities.

W J S

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL


MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

TELEPHONE:- 01-928 7999 Extn: 4237

Our Ref: A/10/Clearances/1744



22 January 1969

Please refer to your letter HU/328/05 of 18th December 1968 about the supply of A.41 VHF manpack radios to Iraq.

The General Staff have objections on operational grounds to the supply of these radios. They consider that the increased capability noted in one dissident organisation recently is such that if this type of radio is supplied their capacity to use medium mortars would be enhanced significantly. We therefore cannot agree to the supply of A.41 manpack sets to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

K. W. NUTTING

*K.A. Plant, Esq.,
Ministry of Technology EIR 2c3.*

*mortars! And we're thinking
of supplying Red Top!*

Copies for information to:

C.G. Warman Esq
C.A. Alldis Esq
D.J.S. Murray Esq
L.A. Savigar Esq
D.E. Church Esq
Miss J.E. Stevens
R.E. Adams Esq
J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS 13(b)
Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
Foreign Office, DT & SD
Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
Board of Trade, (XP)
Board of Trade, (ELB)
H.M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

Mr. Mahon Jan 31,

*And lightning!! No doubt the tech
will come back on this - Ray not only right &.*

35/1/69

*p.c.
Jan 31, J. S. J.*




MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR2(c)3,
Room 203,Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W1
Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintech London Telex
Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext.135

Our reference: HU/328/07

Your reference:

21st January, 1969.*See minute*

Dear Mr. Murray,

As you know, we have recently been in correspondence with the Army Department concerning the release of information and possible supply of Green Archer and Cymbeline to Iraq. Indications of a requirement for up to 50 mortar locators have reached EMI Electronics from various independent sources and although we are checking this out through our Defence Attache in Baghdad there would certainly appear to be all the signs of a large potential order.

The reaction of Army Department is that they would not object to the sale of Green Archer now, or to the subsequent possible follow-on sale of Cymbeline provided that MOD had an in-service lead time of at least 18 months. This would put delivery at not earlier than 1973/74. The former equipment could be delivered within 15 months of an order, provided, of course, that EMI elects to reopen the Green Archer production line, and would give a theoretical Iraqi in service date of early 1971 onwards.

You will perhaps note from your records that clearance for the supply of Green Archer was in fact given in May 1967 although it is not clear from the papers which I hold if this was handled within the AWP. However, in view of the intervening political changes I would be grateful for your agreement or views on the question of supply as detailed in the foregoing.

Yours sincerely,

K. JOHND.J.S. Murray Esq.,
F.O./C.O. Def. Supply & Training Dept.,
Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Mr. Makinson - Near Eastern Dept.

Mortar Locating Radars

I minuted you some time ago (Flag A) about the possible Iraqi interest in mortar locating radars which we had seen reflected in a Baghdad telegram.

2. The attached letter HU/328/07 of 21 January, 1969 from EIR 2c is the follow up. Your reaction to the suggestion was to approve it; but you will note from the letter that the interest which the Iraqis are alleged to have shown has not reached the stage of a firm offer to purchase.

3. I asked EIR 2c whether they were able to add anything which might indicate that the Iraqi interest was well founded. At present the only evidence is from E.M.I. Electronics who say that their man in Baghdad has been approached by three separate Iraqis each claiming that the desire to acquire these radars for Iraq exists.

4. Mintech have sent a telegram to the Defence Attache at Baghdad asking him to substantiate the alleged Iraqi interest. You may wish to delay replying to this letter until we have seen the Defence Attache's response. I have, in the meantime, told Mintech that we are reluctant to give an opinion on hypothetical questions; that we may be able to approve the supply of Green Archer; but that our assessment of the Iraqi security made it most unlikely that we would be prepared to give approval to the supply of Cymbaline at this distance from the probable date of supply in 1973/74. *leaving in mind that in discussion about it would have to be assessed*

value.

D. J. S. Murray
(D. J. S. Murray)
24 January, 1969

DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

I agree. PL Bu. 28 Feb

no new news yet. BU. on 10/3

CONFIDENTIAL

These are the two Iraqis are showing an interest in Green Archer/Cymbaline. But nothing concrete as yet to the Defence Attache. so ca. 10/3

*I agree
"if the request
were made"
see f. 16 of the*

DEFO --- 040

HH

DSAO - T - BRITMILATT BAGHDAD

DE RBDWC 0611 27/1620Z

PRIORITY 271114Z JAN

FM MOD ARMY

TO BRITMILATT BAGHDAD

BT

CONFIDENTIAL OYT FOR TUFFILL PD FROM HALL PD YOUR OYT OF 23 JAN PD

1. RATES DISCUSSED HOGG ROBINSON PD OUR RATES BASED ON SPECIALLY NEGOTIATED FLAT RATE FOR ALL GOVERNMENT VEHICLES IRRESPECTIVE OF VALUE AND CLASS PD THIS PARTICULARLY ADVANTAGEOUS WHEN ARMoured VEHICLES SHIPPED AS WEIGHT AND HIGH VALUE MAKE COMMERCIAL RATES MUCH HIGHER PD OUR RATES AT LEAST HALF COMMERCIAL RATE PD THIS CONFIRMED BY CROWN AGENTS RATE FOR SAUDI WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH YOU AND C.A RATES ABOUT 10 PERCENT LOWER THAN COMMERCIAL PD
2. HAVE SPOKEN AYLIF JONES PD HE NEEDS THREE DAYS TO PREPARE SPECIFICATIONS AND PRICES PD WILL YOU WAIT IN BAGHDAD FOR HIM OR WILL YOU ASK D.A. TO ASSIST PD ALTERNATIVELY WILL MEET YOU IN BEIRUT PD
3. EXPECTS TO ARRIVE FRIDAY BUT IF YOU PROPOSE WAITING BAGHDAD WILL TRY TO ARRIVE THURSDAY PD THIS ALL SUBJECT TO YOUR ADVICE PD FLIGHT DETAILS ADVISED EARLIEST PD PLEASE ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION
4. TRIPOLI HAVE SIGNALLED PD PAYNE STATES NO DECISION TAKEN BY MINISTER ON VIGILANT CONVERSION PD PAYNE SUGGESTS YOU POSTPONE VISIT BUT GO AHEAD WITH PREPARATION OF AMENDMENT FOR EMBASSY TO SIGN WHEN MINISTER APPROVES PD
5. NOT YET RECEIVED DAIMLERS COSTS BUT BAC CONFIRM PRICE OF £3250 PD INCREASE STATED TO BE DUE TO NON AVAILABILITY OF ITEMS PREVIOUSLY DRAWN FROM ARMY STOCKS PD THIS MEANS SPECIAL MANUFACTURE OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF MANY ITEMS AT UNECONOMIC COSTS PD
6. MY VIEW IS CONVERSION WILL COST MINIMUM OF £5000 PD CONSIDER POSTPONEMENT OF VISIT WHICH GIVES CHANCE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF PRICE MAY BE ADVISABLE PD
7. ALL WELL AT HOME

BT

C WA IS CONVERSION

C WA CONSIDER POSTPONEMENT



COPIES MADE

W 23
22

Date 27/1/69

Despatched 2301 Z

Draft

Telegram to ~~BACHDAD~~

No. 0

Date 27/1/69

~~Flash~~
~~Immediate~~
Priority

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~

CYPHER

~~Mr. Rumph~~
DT & S D

NO COPIES MADE

~~En Clair~~

~~Code~~

Cypher

Following for Ministry Attaché

From MOI Army

Telegram No. OYT 271114Z JAN

Reg & Submit

Begins

(Here insert from A-B of attached text)

~~Mr. Murray~~
~~[Signature]~~

29/1


20/3/1

Mr. Makinson, New Enter Dept. 27/1

New Custer Dept.

(24)

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF ARMS WORKING PARTY MEETING OF 28 Jan 69



6. POSSIBLE SUPPLY TO IRAQ OF C.S. GAS

RESTRICTED

(Board of Trade letter ELB 1426/P dated 1st January 1969)

The Board of Trade letter of 1st January 1969, advised that Schermuly had enquired about the possibility of obtaining a licence for the export of C.S. gas to Iraq. A separate approach had also been made to the Army Department, but it was of a tentative nature and was in respect of the UAR as well as Iraq.

THE CHAIRMAN enquired whether the proposal referred to the export of appliances containing C.S. gas or to the gas itself, and MISS STEVENS confirmed that it was for the export of the appliances with the gas.

MR MURRAY said the enquiry was too recent for a Foreign and Commonwealth view to have been formed.

THE WORKING PARTY:-

AGREED to discuss the proposal more fully at a later date.

Approved since given.

pa

WMMH

17/2

CONFIDENTIAL

From: A. Miller, Sales 5(b)(A)




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street

Telephone: 01-928 7999 Ext 3629

ref: 10/Clearances/2327
 Your ref: ELB 1426/P



February, 1969

Dear Miss Stevens,

Your letter to Mr Tallboys on 1 Jan 1969 refers to the possibility of Schermuly selling their anti-riot stores to Iraq.

We have now consulted the General Staff on this matter and they have operational objections to such supply being approved. They consider that these supplies would be diverted to other countries within the Middle East and so might rebound against ourselves.

We have received the enquiry from Schermuly direct and will inform them that we do not wish them to sell to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

Miss J.E. Stevens
 Board of Trade (ELB)
 Hillgate House

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

D.J.S. Murray F & C.O.

D. Church BOT(XO)

C.G. Warman DS 13

PA PNM
 13/2

all on 10/2
 file.

Reg. NEQ.
 Have we any human
 consequences?

PMH

14/2

1A PNM 17/2.

Handwritten notes and stamps:
 Nam E. ...
 25
 10/2
 Mr. Handcliff
 18
 17/2

~~Restricted~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(29(a))

Near East Dept.

A.W.P. Meeting 25 Feb 69



(viii) Possible supply to Iraq of C.S. Gas

RESTRICTED

THE WORKING PARTY:-

NOTED that Schermuly's had been notified by Ministry of Defence (Sales (A)) that approval could not be given for the Supply of Containers with C.S. Gas to Iraq.

P.A.
PMM4
26/3

~~Restricted~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

CYHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(26)

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STCW 5

11 FEBRUARY 1969

NEQ 10/2

Mr. Tripp

Burr

B. Spear

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TELNO. STOW5
OF 11 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO JEDDA,
BOT (CREDAS) AND FCO

13
2

YOUR TELEGRAM STOW 5: LIGHTNINGS.

B.A.C.'S TERMS WERE PASSED TO ABADI SOME TIME
AGO AND WE HAVE SEEN HIM SUBSEQUENTLY. HE SAID THAT,
THOUGH THE TERMS WERE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE,
THE LIGHTNING DEAL WAS BOUND UP WITH THE QUESTION OF WIDER
COMMERCIAL CREDIT WHICH IT WAS HOPED MIGHT BE ARRANGED THROUGH
THE COMET MISSION (MY TELNO. CREDAS16). FURTHER
THIS WAS NOT THE TIME FOR THE BA'ATH GOVERNMENT TO RISK
ANY LEAK OF A DEAL WITH B.A.C. AFTER THE EVENTS OF
THE LAST TWO WEEKS, THOUGH THEY STILL SEEMED TO WANT TO
GO AHEAD AND WERE SATISFIED WITH ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY
MADE WITH THE SAUDI ARABIANS. ON THE OTHER
HAND, KASSAR, THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, MIGHT SHORTLY
GO TO PARIS. THIS COULD INDICATE A REVIVAL OF INTEREST
IN MIRAGES BUT ABADI WOULD KEEP US INFORMED SO THAT
WE CAN TELL BROWN OF B.A.C.

/2. ABADI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

2. ABADI MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOW STUDYING THE REPORT ON RAPIER BY RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL ZAKI HUSSAIN HILMI AND THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO BUY +A LARGE NUMBER+ - HE COULD NOT INDICATE THE NUMBER - OF JET PROVOSTS, WHICH WERE REQUIRED FOR POSSIBLE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDS. FOR THIS PURPOSE TOO THEY WERE ORDERING RUSSIAN M. 10 HELICOPTERS.

3. PLEASE PASS THE PARTS OF THE FOREGOING AFFECTING B.A.C. TO BROWN.

FCC PLEASE PASS TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY, JEDUA, BOT (CREDA).

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[COPIES SENT TO B.O.T.]

STOW DISTRIBUTION
N.E.D.
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 18 FEB 1966 NEQ 10/2 |
|---|

(27)

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Arthur

This summarizes the present position.
We are looking at the Tigercat question -
non-supply to the USSR

Arms to Iraq

2. May we please discuss
further action? J. P. Tripp

At present there are the following possibilities for sales:

13.2

(a) Lightnings (with Red Top missiles)

Under a submission of 17 January, it was recommended that we should agree provided conditions remained unchanged, but only when the Iraqi Government made a firm request to purchase. Mr. Arthur decided that the Embassies in Teheran, Kuwait and Jedda should also be consulted. We can take it from the Jedda reply that the Saudi Arabians would not object. The Embassy in Teheran think that the Iranians would not seriously object but this must be put to them when a sale becomes more likely. It must also be put to the Kuwaitis who have not been consulted. Furthermore, political conditions have now changed somewhat. We have not yet had an official request from the Iraqi Government and Baghdad telegram No. STOW 5 indicates that the Lightning deal may be bound up with the question of wider commercial credit, which might have been arranged through the Comet Mission. There thus may not be any immediate development.

In short, we await the Iraqi request and at that time the matter will have to be looked at carefully and if the political conditions permit a sale, the Iranians and Kuwaitis must be consulted.

(b) Tigercat

The Departmental recommendation is that we should tell the Ministry of Technology that we have no objection.

(c) Rapier

Baghdad telegram No. STOW 5 reports that the Iraqis are studying the papers on Rapier. This may be a red herring and nothing may come of it. In any case, the answer should be 'no'.

(d) Jet Provosts

Baghdad telegram No. STOW 5 reports that a decision has been taken to buy "a large number" of these aircraft. The next step will presumably be an approach by the Iraqi Government to the suppliers who will then go through the usual machinery of obtaining approval. This, too, will have to be looked at in the circumstances at the time. Jet Provosts are, as you know, slow aircraft largely used for training purposes and since they do not have much of an offensive rôle there might not be objection to supply. On the other hand, they could certainly be used against the Kurds and this is the purpose of the purchase. This aspect will require careful consideration.

SECRET

/...

SECRET

(e) Helicopters

It seems that the Iraqis are ordering these from the Russians. If they apply to us, there would probably be no objection, although the Kurdish considerations apply here too.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)
13 February, 1969.

We spoke. I agree. I am not sure whether we shd. give much weight to Kurdish considerations: there could be subsumed in anything we decided to say to Iran.

E 18
2

Mr. J. J. J.

Mr. Schmidt

Mr. Hinchcliffe *PRM* 19/2

Ester

Pa. Ann.
2d/2

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15

25 FEB 1969

NK Q 10/2

(28)

Mr. Asland

attached

Baghdad telegram No. 193- paragraph 2

Surely we need do nothing until we receive a more specific approach.

2. Our line in the part on arms deals with Iraq has been that we should not commit ourselves into agreeing on any particular sale in advance but examine each deal individually in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of "point of sale". This is obviously sensible in view of the chronic instability of Iraqi regimes when new situations can arise overnight.

3. If we have to give guidance to the Commercial Counsellor (and this has not been asked for) then we could suggest that he should announce his readiness to talk business without commitment.

4. The COMET mission (postponed at the request of the Iraqi Government on 30 January) was going to discuss the granting of credit for deals with Iraq. No doubt credit terms could be arranged in the normal way - but this would also depend on the financial standing/political stability of the Iraqi Government at the time when negotiations on special deals near their final stages

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
20 February, 1969.

*I agree, and I have answered
a separate query from Mr Arthur*

to this

$$\frac{24}{2}$$

Reg. & La.

PRM 4
25/2

20 February, 1959.

1892

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NO. 193

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
18 FEBRUARY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 193 OF 18 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
SAVING TO CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM,
BEIRUT, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS
NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 191: ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR CALLED ON 17 FEBRUARY ON DIRECTOR GENERAL AT
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY. HE WAS PERSONALLY AS FRIENDLY AS EVER BUT
SAID THAT HE WAS QUOTE FED UP UNQUOTE BECAUSE POLITICS WERE
STANDING IN WAY OF MINISTRY'S PLANS FOR CO-OPERATION WITH U.K.
IN INDUSTRIAL SPHERE FOLLOWING MINISTERIAL VISIT TO LONDON IN
DECEMBER. BABAJAN SAID THAT CLIMATE HAD AGAIN BEEN SOURED BY REPORT
OF BRITISH ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL. CONSEQUENTLY HIS MINISTER HAD
COMPLETELY STOPPED ALL DEALINGS WITH BRITISH FIRMS WITH WHICH HE
WAS NEGOTIATING (I.C.U.(SIC) FOR A PETRY(SIC) CHEMICAL INDUSTRY,
DUNLOP FOR A TYRE FACTORY, BMC FOR A CAR ASSEMBLY PLANT AND
STEWART AND FLETCHER FOR A SUGAR FACTORY, ETC) ON ACCOUNT OF
QUOTE BRITAIN'S UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARABS UNQUOTE.
HE EXPRESSED INTENTION HOWEVER OF WORKING AWAY QUIETLY, AND
POSSIBLY VISITING U.K., TO GET AGREEMENTS PREPARED WHICH COULD
BE SIGNED IF AND WHEN CLIMATE PERMITTED.

2. COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR WAS ALSO APPROACHED ON 17 FEBRUARY BY A
COUSIN OF TAKRITI WHO ACTS AS A COMMISSION AGENT. HE SAID THAT IF
U.K. WERE WILLING TO SELL ARMS TO IRAQ THERE WOULD BE LARGE ORDERS
FORTHCOMING, PROVIDED QUOTE LOANS UNQUOTE 'BY WHICH HE SEEMED TO
MEAN SUITABLE CREDIT TERMS' COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND HE HIMSELF GOT
HIS COMMISSION. HE SPOKE OF REQUIREMENTS ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS BUT
MENTIONED AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND GUNS. IF U.K. WAS WILLING TO SELL,
HE WOULD ARRANGE AN EARLY MEETING WITH DIRECTOR OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS FOR THE C.C. AND DEFENCE ATTACHE AND HE PRODUCED A

/ DOCUMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

MGS

WANE

BT

2357

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

DOCUMENT ON HEADED MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NOTE PAPER FROM TAKRITI'S SECRETARY STATING THAT HE WAS PERMITTED TO SEE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR.

3. HAWLEY ASKED WHY THIS APPROACH WAS BEING (? GROUP OMITTED) IN AN INDIRECT WAY AND TAKRITI'S COUSIN SAID THAT IT WAS BECAUSE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MAKE A DIRECT APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN U.K. WAS ALLEGED TO BE SELLING ARMS TO ISRAEL. THIS WAS VERY SERIOUS. BUT IN HIS CONNECTION HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO HEAR DENIAL ON BBC. PRESENT GOVERNMENT WERE ANTI COMMUNIST (MORE THAN 90 PER CENT OF PEOPLE IN IRAQ HATED COMMUNISTS) AND WANTED TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE WEST, IN PARTICULAR U.K. IF ARMS DEAL COULD BE NEGOTIATED SATISFACTORILY, THIS WOULD OPEN DOOR TO A GREAT DEAL OF CIVILIAN BUSINESS AS WELL.

FCO PASS SAVING TO CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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NNNNN

New Eastern Dept.

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF ARMS WORKING PARTY MEETING OF 28 JAN 69

5. RELAXATION OF THE EMBARGO ON THE SUPPLY OF LAND EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

CONFIDENTIAL

(FCO letter dated 8th October 1968, and Sales (A) letter 10/Clearances/1744 dated 28th October 1968)

THE WORKING PARTY:-

NOTED that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the General Staff had agreed to lift the embargo on the supply of small arms to Iraq and to consider future applications individually on their merits.

6. SUPPLY OF LIGHTNING AND RED TOP TO IRAQ
(Mintech paper ESC(0)(69)2)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Ministry of Technology provided a paper (ESC(0)(69)2) for submission to Ministers seeking approval to the supply of Lightning and Red Top to Iraq. This paper was considered by the Strategic Exports Official Committee on 20th January 1969 (ESC(0)(69) 1st Meeting) and, as a result, the Ministry of Technology were invited to prepare a new paper incorporating several points raised at the meeting. BAC were authorised to continue discussions with the Iraq's but without commitment on BAC's part to supply.

THE WORKING PARTY:-

NOTED the position



Reg-
fa. PMH

26/2

New Eastern Dept.

(29)

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF ARMS WORKING PARTY MEETING OF 25 JAN 69

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 21 JAN 69 |
| NEQ 10/2 |

(viii) Possible Supply to Iraq of C.S. Gas

RESTRICTED

MR MURRAY said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had no objection to the export to Iraq of containers filled with C.S. Gas. MR BROWNE said the Army Department did object and were writing to say so.

THE WORKING PARTY:-

NOTED

Reg & Co.

PMMH

26/2

30

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 250

26 FEBRUARY 1969.



NE

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDSO TO FCO TEL NO 250 OF 26 FEB AND TO MOD ARMY (SALES) AND MINTECH.

28

MY TELEGRAM NO 193 (NOT TO ALL): ARMS FOR IRAQ.

THE DEFENCE ATTACHE CALLED ON THE DMO ON 24 FEB. THE LATTER MADE NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR BRITISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE STILL VERY MUCH INTERESTED.

2. THE DMO ASKED WHETHER AN INVITATION HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE DCGS, HIMSELF AND TWO OTHER OFFICERS TO ATTEND AN AIR DEFENCE SCHEME DEMONSTRATION IN U.K. THE DA REPLIED THAT HE WAS HOPING FOR AN EARLY REPLY TO A TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HALL OF DEFENCE SALES. THE DMO EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND A LITTLE IMPATIENCE.

3. THE DA MENTIONED LIGHTNING AS PART OF THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM BUT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS FAVOURABLE COMMENT ON THE AIRCRAFT AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS IN SERVICE IN OTHER ARAB AIR FORCES, THE SUBJECT WAS CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE DMO'S PROVINCE.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ASKED ABOUT PROGRESS ON THE PROPOSED FERRET SCOUT CAR DEAL, THE DMO REPLIED QUOTE YOU KNOW THAT WE WANT THEM UNQUOTE AND ASKED A STAFF OFFICER THE SITUATION. THE LATTER SAID THAT EXPERTS WERE STUDYING SUCH MATTERS AS THE SALE OF SPARE PARTS AND THAT AN ANSWER WOULD BE READY AFTER THE HOLIDAY, I.E. IN A WEEK OR MORE.

5. THE DA FOUND A SUB-COMMITTEE OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS WORKING ON TIGER CAT PAPERS.

6. THE INTEREST IS CLEARLY THERE AND EARLY PROOF OF THE SINCERITY OF STATEMENTS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SELL ARMS TO THE ARABS INCLUDING THE IRAQIS COULD HELP TO OFFSET THE DAMAGE DONE BY THE REPORTED ISRAEL QUOTE ARMS DEAL UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS MOD ARMY AND MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

/SENT TO D.C.C. AND TO MINTECH/

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DEF. POL. D.

P.U.S.D.

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Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15

26 FEB 1969

NEQ 26/6

Copy for
NEQ 10/2.

Mr. Tripp

I agree with Mr. Acland's
argument and recommendation.

J.P. [signature]

Anglo/Iraqi Commercial Relations and
Arms Sales

Mr. Arthur asked how we were going to deal with the approach in paragraph 2 of Baghdad telegram No. 193 (attached). He suggested that we should consult DTSD.

2. I have spoken to DTSD whose views agree with mine and Mr. Hinchcliffe's. The Iraqis are sending out rather contradictory signals both about commercial relations and arms deals. On the one hand we hear that the Minister has instructed that all dealings with British firms should be stopped (because of the rumours of arms for Israel); on the other hand members of the Ministry say that they will work away quietly, and we get a round-about approach through a commission agent for sales of arms.

3. HM Embassy Baghdad have not made any recommendations nor have they asked for guidance.

4. I think that we should only become active, particularly on arms sales to Iraq, when:-

either the Iraqis make a definite request to a British firm for supply or a particular weapon, and the firm subsequently approaches us for an export licence;

or when there is a Governmental approach to HM Embassy, Baghdad which requires an official reply.

We will only be led up the garden path or may cross wires if we respond vigorously to other overtures made by people whose main interest is probably to gain some commission for themselves.

5. In short, I recommend no action for the time being.

[signature]

(A. A. Acland)

25 February, 1969

c.c. Mr. Hinchcliffe

less.

he should be. copy 1

then in the relevant column

file as well.

[signature]

28/2

25
2

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(32)

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BRITISH DEFENCE ATTACHE BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

EDQ 271535Z FEB


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Copy to NEQ 3/5/81

NE

ADDRESSED TO M.O.D. (SALES) TELEGRAM NO.EDQ 271535Z FEB
AND TO MINTECH
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO.



FOR GENERAL HALL FROM DEFATT.

YOUR EDQ 251650Z REFERS.

ARMS FOR IRAQ

REQUEST FOR DEMONSTRATION OF AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS,
PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE REPORTS OF BRITISH SUPPLIES
OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL.

2. SITUATION ON ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. AA GUNS. IRAQIS WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
UNLIKELY THAT ANY WERE AVAILABLE AND CERTAINLY NO 40 MM
BOFORS. THOUGH DISAPPOINTED AT THE LATTER, I FEEL
THAT ENQUIRY FOR OTHER TYPES WAS CASUAL.

B. RAPIER. THEY WERE WARNED THAT FOR SECURITY
AND PRODUCTION REASONS THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF
DELIVERY FOR A MATTER OF YEARS. THEY STILL EXPRESSED
GREAT INTEREST.

C. THUNDERBIRD. THEY REGARDED THIS AS A POSSIBLE INTERIM
WEAPON PENDING RAPIER AND WOULD PROBABLY BE INTERESTED
IN A LARGE ORDER IF DELIVERY DATES WERE REASONABLE.

SECRET

/D.

D. TIGERCAT. I HAVE SEEN A SUB-COMMITTEE WORKING ON SHORTS BROCHURES AND INTEREST IS VERY STRONG. THEY ARE AWARE OF A DEAL WITH JORDAN. IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY THAT SECURITY OF THE SYSTEM CAN BE PRESERVED WITH SO MANY IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN.

E. LIGHTNING. WHILST AIRCRAFT WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF DMO'S ENQUIRIES, FAVOURABLE COMMENT WAS PASSED ON THE AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE SYSTEM. MINTECH ARE AWARE OF THE POSITION.

F. ELECTRONICS. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THIS FIELD AND BRITISH EARLY WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ENJOYS A HIGH REPUTATION. MINTECH CAN SUPPLY DETAILS OF PRESENT POSITION.

3. WHILST I APPRECIATE THE DANGERS OF A MISSION RETURNING HOME EMPTY-HANDED, IT STILL APPEARS TO ME THAT THERE IS SCOPE FOR A USEFUL VISIT. ON THE OTHER HAND, I CONSIDER THAT AN ADMISSION OF OUR INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO MEET THEIR REQUESTS WOULD EFFECTIVELY END ALL PROSPECTS OF MILITARY SALES HERE. THIS IN TURN WOULD CAUSE SIDE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

4. I THEREFORE EARNESTLY REQUEST THAT AN INVITATION TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION DURING MARCH BE ISSUED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN THE MEANTIME WE WILL WORK ON THE EXPENSE ASPECT OF THE VISIT THROUGH F C O CHANNELS.

5. H.M. AMBASSADOR AGREES.
FCO PASS TO MOD (SALES) AND MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

[SENT TO D.C.C. AND MINTECH]

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 254

28 FEBRUARY, 1969

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15

3 March 1969

NEQ 10/2

Copy to

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ADDSO TO FCO TEL NO 254 OF 28 FEB REPTD FOR INFMN TO CAIRO

AND SVG TO ALGIERS BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BEIRUT AMMAN JEDDA

KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS U.K.MIS NEW YORK

AND WASHINGTON.

30

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 249 AND 250: ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

IN THESE TELEGRAMS I SUGGESTED THAT THE DAMAGE DONE HERE IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST US OVER THE ISRAELI "ARMS DEAL" MIGHT BE MITIGATED BY OUR READINESS TO SELL ARMS TO IRAQ. IN FACT THIS IS PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY AT PRESENT OF IMPROVING THE SITUATION.

2. GENERAL HALL'S REFERENCES IN HIS TELEGRAM NO EDQ 251650Z FEB TO POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES ARE OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD, AT LEAST TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION CALLS FOR THE GREATEST CAUTION. THERE ARE HOWEVER A NUMBER OF POLITICAL POINTS WHICH SHOULD, I CONSIDER, BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, APART FROM THE OVER-RIDING ONE OF THE OBVIOUS DANGER TO OUR INTERESTS HERE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. THESE POINTS ARE:

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/(A) RECENT

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-2-

(A) RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE STRESSED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR ARMS SUPPLY POLICY NOR IN OUR POLICY OF WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE (EG YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 TO CAIRO). IF WE FULFIL EXISTING COMMITMENTS TO THE ISRAELIS WHILE REJECTING IRAQI REQUESTS EVEN FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE IRAQIS OF OUR IMPARTIALITY IN WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT:

(B) SALE OF SOME OF THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN TELEGRAM NO EDQ 251650Z FEB HAVE, I AM INFORMED, ALREADY BEEN MADE TO OTHER ARAB STATES AND THE IRAQIS WOULD FEEL DOUBLY AGGRIEVED IF WE FAILED TO SUPPLY THEM:

(C) WHATEVER THE IMAGE OF IRAQ IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, (AND I REALIZE THAT IT IS AT PRESENT FAR FROM BEING A GOOD ONE) THERE ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE REGIME WHO STILL WISH TO DO BUSINESS WITH US FOR POLITICAL AS WELL AS TECHNICAL REASONS. THEY HOPE BY INCREASING COMMERCIAL DEALINGS WITH US TO WEAKEN THE INFLUENCE OF THE U S S R AND THE BLOC:

(D) A KEY TO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR COMMERCIAL POSITION - ALWAYS ASSUMING THAT IT IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE ISRAELI 'ARMS DEAL' IS TO DO SUBSTANTIAL ARMS BUSINESS WITH THE IRAQIS AT LEAST FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. IF WE CONCLUDED THIS SUCCESSFULLY, IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE WHO ARE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS US AND OPEN THE DOOR FOR INCREASED BUSINESS IN THE CIVILIAN SPHERE. THE ARMS DEALS IN THEMSELVES COULD BE WORTH MANY MILLIONS OF POUNDS AND IN ADDITION COULD CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR IMPORTANT TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC DEALS WITH FIRMS SUCH AS MARCONI AND STC:

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/(E)

CONFIDENTIAL
BAGHDAD TELNO 254 TO FCO

-3-

(E) IF WE TURN DOWN THE PRESENT IRAQI APPROACH TO US FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TURN ELSEWHERE AND THE ATMOSPHERE FOR FUTURE ARMS DEALS AS WELL AS LARGE SCALE COMMERCIAL BUSINESS WILL BE SOURED.

3. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY HAD NO HESITATION IN ENDORSING MY DA'S RECOMMENDATION THAT AN INVITATION SHOULD BE EXTENDED WITHOUT DELAY TO THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO SEND THEIR EXPERTS TO ATTEND THE PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT - PLEASE SEE MY TEL EDQ 271535Z

32

FCO PASS ROUTINE CAIRO AND SVG TO ALGIERS BAHRAIN RES BEIRUT AMMAN JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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~~Mr. Acland~~

(MATRIPON REVERSE)

Arms for Iraq

You will have seen the recent telegraphic correspondence on this topic (copies attached).

Her Majesty's Ambassador Baghdad has enthusiastically supported his Military Attaché's view that an Iraqi delegation should be invited to the United Kingdom to attend an air defence system demonstration. M.O.D. (Sales) point out that the mounting of such an exercise is an enormously complicated and costly operation and feel that it might be more appropriate for any visit from an Iraqi delegation to take the form of a trip around the U.K. in a series of visits to R.A.F. stations (to see Lightnings), to arms factories, missile establishments - in other words the usual around the houses arms sales trip. It could also be arranged for the delegation to see a demonstration (at a low security level) of a working model of Rapier if this was thought desirable.

2. As such a trip mainly concerns air defence Ministry of Technology would organise it and M.O.D. (Sales) (W/Commander Harle) understands that if a visit was approved, the Ministry would be prepared to pay all the delegation's expenses whilst in the U.K. but are not willing to pay the air fares UK/Iraq return. He wondered if F.C.O. would pay for these. I made it clear that as far as I knew, we have no funds for such purposes so he undertook to take up this point with the Ministry of Technology once more and to let me know MINTECH's thinking on the desirability or otherwise (from a sales point of view) of an Iraqi delegation coming on this kind of tour.

3. I have asked Mr. Murray of D.T.S.D. to draw up as a guide for H.M.A. in Baghdad a list of weapons in three categories:

- (a) those arms which we would not be prepared to sell to the Iraqis either now or in the foreseeable future (e.g. Rapier);
- (b) weapons which we would be prepared to supply under present circumstances assuming that Anglo/Iraqi relations do not deteriorate dramatically (e.g. Ferret armoured cars, troop carriers, small arms etc.);

/(c) arms

(c) arms in the borderline category where a decision could go either way --- (e.g. Tigercat, Lightnings, Thunderbird etc.).

4. Mr. Murray is consulting the Arms Working Party and will let us have these lists soon. Any guidance that we give based on the three categories will not, of course, affect our basic standpoint which is that we cannot give blanket clearance to arms sales in advance and can only come to a decision after considering the political factors relevant at the point of sale. This point was made to Baghdad in a letter from Mr. Makinson last October.

5. As we have been bombarded on arms sales by Mr. Evans I suggest we send an interim reply as in the attached draft telegram. M.O.D. (Sales) and Min Tech would like to clear the text of the telegram that concerns them before it is sent off. Min Tech is dragging its feet on the question of a visit and do not want to give Baghdad the impression that they are at all enthusiastic!

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Department
4 March 1969

I have amended the telegram to take account of the decision to sell Tigercat. Mr Hinchcliffe will now get clearance from Minked and MOD. and submit the draft to you.

AA Atland 5/3

Mr Hinchcliffe (first)

Mr Tipp

Draft attached. I have cleared with MINTECH AND MOD

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe
5/3

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5.3

5/3

(35)

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227

TO BAGHDAD

| |
|-----------------|
| RECEIVED 1969 |
| ARCHIVES No. 15 |
| 7 MAR 1969 |
| NEQ 10/2 |

(NE)

copy to
NEQ 10/3

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ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 5 MARCH REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO CAIRO ALGIERS BAHRAIN BEIRUT AMMAN
JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NOS. 249, 250 AND 254 (NOT TO ALL):

ARMS FOR IRAQ.

APPROVAL HAS NOW BEEN GIVEN FOR THE SALE OF TIGERCAT TO IRAQ.
SHORTS, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AT THE IRAQI
EMBASSY TODAY, HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

2. YOUR PROPOSALS FOR A VISIT INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS OF WEAPONS
ARE BEING LOOKED AT AGAIN BY MINTECH. CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE AND
COMPLEXITY OF MOUNTING A FULL SCALE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION
WOULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED, BUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WILL BE
CONSIDERED AT AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON 7 MARCH.

3. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN YOUR TELE-
GRAMS UNDER REVERENCE, BUT AS REGARDS GENERAL POLICY ON ARMS
SALES WE MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE CONSIDERATIONS

/EXPLAINED

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-2-

EXPLAINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF TRIPP'S LETTER OF 26 FEBRUARY TO YOU AND IN MAKINSON'S LETTER NEQ 10/1 OF 10 OCTOBER 1968 TO SAUNDERS. WE WILL HOWEVER DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS ARE CONSIDERED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL TIGERCAT SHOULD HELP YOU TO HOLD THE POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING .

4. FUTURE TELEGRAMS ON THE MECHANICS OF A VISIT AND DEMONSTRATION IN CONNECTION WITH AIR DEFENCE SALES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO MINTECH AS/EIR 2 IN THE STOW SERIES WITH COPIES TO F.C.O. AND AS/EIR 1.

STEWART.

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U.N.D.

MILITARY ADVISER

D.T.S.D.

P.U.S.D.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

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Registry No. **NE**
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

| SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | PRIORITY MARKINGS |
|---|---|
| Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified | Flash Immediate } Priority Routine |

(Date).....

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In Confidence

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

BAGHDAD

Addressed to

telegram No.....(date).....

And to

repeated for information to saving CAIRO, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

Saving to.....

Your telegram Nos. 249,250 and 254 (not to all):

Arms for Iraq.

Approval has now been given for the sale of Tigercat to Iraq. Shorts, who are continuing their negotiations at the Iraqi Embassy today, have been informed.

2. Your proposals for a visit including demonstrations of weapons are being looked at again by Mintech. Considerable expense and complexity of mounting a full scale air defence system demonstration would hardly be justified, but possible alternatives will be considered at an interdepartmental meeting on 7 March.

3. We also attach importance to the arguments set out in your telegrams under reference, but as regards general policy on arms sales we must continue to operate within the considerations

/explained.....

Draft Telegram to:—
Baghdad

No. *227*

(Date) *5/3*

And to:—

COPIES ATTACHED

Repeat to:
Cairo, Rabat, Algiers, Bahrain, Res'y, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, UKmis New York, Washington.

Distribution:—


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UN Dis MOD (Sales)

5/3.
Copies to
PUSD (Mintech),
Def. Pol. (AS/EIR
/1)
(AS/EIR
2)
MOD/HDS

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

explained in paragraph 7 of Tripp's letter of
26 February to you and in Makinson's letter NEQ
10/1 of 10 October 1968 to Saunders. We will
however do our best to ensure that specific
requests are considered as quickly as possible.
The agreement in principle to sell Tigercat
should help you to hold the position for the time
being.

4. Future telegrams on the mechanics ^{of} a visit and
demonstration in connection with air defence sales
should be addressed to Mintech AS/EIR 2 in the Stow
series with copies to F.C.②. and AS/EIR 1.


5.3

FLAG A

FLAG B

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

TELEGRAM SECTION N. East.
Room 124 K.C.S
Communications Department

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

227 to Baghdad

TO:

Head of E.I.R 1.

Head of E.I.R.2.

} - Ministry of Technology,
Stuart House.

Head of Defence Sales - M.O.D.

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials)

(Date) 6/3

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE REGISTRY FOR RETENTION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: A. MILLER, Sales 5(b)(A)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1
Telephone: 01-928 7999, Ext 3629



A/10/Clearances/1910

11th March 1969*Dear David,*SALADINS - IRAQ

We understand that the Iraqis are still interested in acquiring 50 Saladins in addition to the 100 Ferrets which have been approved for supply. DD Sales is going to Iraq shortly and it is felt that he will be asked about Saladins. It could be that the Iraqis say "No Saladins, No Ferrets".

We have consulted the General Staff on the question of Saladins for Iraq. From a purely military operational view they say that the plans of the training mission for the defence of Kuwait are based on the currently known strength of the Iraqis. They are not happy about any escalation on our part to improve the Iraqi armoured capability.

However, they do say that should you consider it desirable on political grounds to let Iraq have Saladins either on the grounds of the sale of UK equipment or UK economy on the basis that if they do not get Saladins they will probably buy comparable equipment elsewhere, they would be willing to accept this view.

Yours sincerely
Arthur Miller

D.J.S. Murray Esq
DT & S Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Copy to: J.B. Wade Esq MOD DS 13

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
Reference.....

Mr. Hinchliffe - Near Eastern Department

Please see Army Sales letter A/10/Clearances/1910 of 11 March, 1969 about a possible supply to Iraq of Saladin armoured cars.

2. You will note that the General Staff are not entirely satisfied ~~at~~ the sale of these vehicles ~~which~~ will not improve the Iraqi armoured capability. They say, however, that they are prepared to give way if we consider it politically desirable for the sale to take place.

3. I presume that you would not wish to object in the event of the Iraqis raising the question of Saladins with DD sales.



(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training and Supply Dept.
13 March, 1969.

Mr Hinchcliffe discussed this with me.
First, we must try to avoid getting involved in the internal Ministry of Defence wrangling. There is an obvious conflict between Sales (who want the sale) and the General Staff who want to ensure that military considerations are taken into account. Sales wish to enlist our support on political grounds. Before showing willing,

would need to consider all the implications carefully & consult British Dept. about Kuwait & so on.

2. But there is also the general & more important point that we do not give clearance in advance for hypothetical orders. Could we DD(Sales) throw the ball back at the Iraqis if they ask about Saladin & say "Is this a firm order"? If so, can you give me a note to this effect, and I will urgently try to clear the sale on my return. You know our policy on arms sales & each order when made has to be considered in the light of all the circumstances at the time. This can be a complicated & sometimes lengthy process.

3. If you agree, perhaps you could put this thought, as you think best, to Mr Miller.

A. A. A. Island
18/3

in Murray

This should satisfy Mr. Antasade
I have told him
Hinchcliffe of his views on
views on Lightning & we
will watch this.

Mr Acland 17/3 (37)
Mr Tuth 17.3

PRIORITY STOW 7 14.3.69
TO: PRODRONE BAHAD
FOR: DEFENCE ATTACHE
FROM: MINTCH, LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEFENCE ATTACHE FROM KIR2(C),
AIR DEFENCE, FCO TELEGRAM 227.

This is the latest move
on which will be
to Iraq. I should imagine
that the Iraqis will accept this
invitation

PMHull 17/3

1. MINTCH KIR2 IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING SUGGESTED VISIT BY IRAQI TEAM.
WITHIN LINES OF GENERAL POLICY ON SALE OF ARMS TO IRAQ WE HAVE DRAWN UP THE
FOLLOWING OUTLINE PROGRAMME, WHICH WE FEEL WILL BE OF USE TO THE IRAQIS AND WHICH
COVERS MAIN ITEMS OF INTEREST NOTIFIED BY YOU:

| | | |
|------------|------|---|
| DAY 1 | A.M. | MOD/MINTCH |
| | P.M. | REI ELECTRONICS, HAYES - GREEN ARCHER |
| DAY 2 | | SHORT BROTHERS, BELFAST - TIGERCAT/SEYVAN |
| DAY 3 | | RAC, WATON - LIGHTNING |
| DAY 4 | | AN RAF STATION (TO INCLUDE PRESENTATION OF AUTOMATED FLIGHTER CONTROL BY ELLIOTT AUTOMATION) |
| DAY 5 | | MARCONI/CHC/ARI, CHILSFORD - RADAR. |
| DAYS 6 & 7 | | WEEKEND - NO OFFICIAL PROGRAMME |
| DAY 8 | | FLESHY, WYBRIDGE & ISSUE OF WIGHT & RADAR |
| DAY 9 | A.M. | HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, DUNFOLD - HAWKER |
| | P.M. | FINAL MEETING WITH MINTCH |

2. RECOMMEND YOU OFFER OFFICIAL INVITATION FOR FOUR SENIOR OFFICERS DURING
PERIOD MID-APRIL TO MID-MAY, COVERING SEVEN WORKING DAYS, WITH TWO FREE DAYS AT
WEEKEND. SUGGEST ARRIVAL ON SUNDAY SO THAT PROGRAMME BEGINS ON MONDAY.

3. EXPENSES - MINTCH WILL PAY FOR HOTELS AND TRAVEL IN U.K. IF YOU FEEL VISIT
WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED UNLESS AIR FARES ARE INCLUDED IN INVITATION, YOU HAVE
DISCRETION ON OUR BEHALF, TO OFFER THESE ALSO.

4. IS TEAM FLUENT IN ENGLISH OR WILL INTERPRETER BE NEEDED?

ORIG:- KIR 2(C)
INFO:- AS/KIR 2 MINTCH
KIR 1A MINTCH
KIR 2B MINTCH
F.C.O. DESD
F.C.O. NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT
H.O.D. DS13

FILE NO:- NE/322/06



pu BMA
19/3.

38

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TOP COPY


CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Blownd TEL NO OFZ/OYT/STOW TO BEIRUT

22 MARCH 1969



CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO DEFAT BEIRUT AND TO MOD NAVY AND MINTECH TELNO.
OFZ/OYT/STOW OF 22 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO FCO.

DEFENCE EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ. DEFAT BEIRUT OFZ/OYT/STOW/075
DATED 14 MARCH REFERS.

1. HELICOPTERS. WESTLAND REPRESENTATIVE DUE IN BAGHDAD
TODAY. PROPOSE TO SUGGEST THAT HE REQUEST TO SEE THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS ON A ROUTINE BUSINESS CALL.

2. LANDROVERS. STOWELL OF ROVERS BEIRUT WAS REC-
ENTLY IN BAGHDAD AND KNOWS THE SITUATION WHICH IS
PROMISING.

3. LAUNCHES. UAR MA TOLD ME ON 18 MARCH THAT THEY
KNEW THAT VOSPERS HAD RECENTLY SUPPLIED FOUR FAST PATROL
BOATS TO ISRAEL. THEY WERE THOUGHT TO BE UNARMED BUT
WERE DEFINITELY REGARDED AS MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ANOTHER
BUILDER MIGHT THEREFORE HAVE A BETTER CHANCE THAN VOSPER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

4. FOR BEIRUT. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO PROMOTE SALES.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFAT BEIRUT MOD NAVY AND MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO DCC AND MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. DEPT.

D.T. & S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

p.a.

*There with telegram - this - reply to Douglas
to Stow? (folio 37)
What should be entered.*

*PMMH
25/3*

CYPHER CAT A
BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
TELNO STOW 8

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MARCH 1969

| |
|-------------------------------|
| (39) |
| RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 |
| 26 MAR 1969 |
| NEQ 10/2 |

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TELNO. STOW 8 OF 21 MARCH REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO FCO.
FOR EIR 2 FROM DEFAT BAGHDAD. AIR DEFENCE.
YOUR STOW DATED 150158Z.

1. IRAQIS HAVE ACCEPTED INVITATION BASED ON OUTLINE
PROGRAMME FOR WORKING WEEK STARTING 21 APRIL.

2. ON ADVICE FROM FRIENDLY SECRETARY TO CGS I FOLLOWED
PRECEDENT SET FOR SUCH INVITATIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND
OFFERED AIR PASSAGES AT UK EXPENSE.

3. AS THERE IS NO DIRECT FLIGHT TO LONDON ON SUNDAYS
IRAQIS REQUESTED ARRIVING IN LONDON ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

4. SINCE WE ARE PAYING FARES I SUGGEST THAT THEY COME
BY BOAC ON FRIDAY 18 APRIL AND RETURN BOAC ON THURSDAY
1 MAY. VC10 WOULD BE GOOD INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH
TECHNOLOGY. IF YOU AGREE, REQUEST THAT YOU BOOK FIRST
CLASS SEATS FOR FOUR ON THESE FLIGHTS.

5. COMPOSITION OF PARTY NOT YET CONFIRMED BUT WILL
PROBABLY BE HEADED BY GENERAL SHENSHAL., THE DCGS
(OPS), AND INCLUDE DMO, A SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICER AND
A TECHNICIAN. A SUITABLE INTERPRETER WILL BE REQUIRED.
I THINK IT LIKELY THAT SOME SERVICE ATTACHES FROM THE
IRAQI EMBASSY WILL WISH TO ACCOMPANY THE PARTY.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

6. REQUEST THAT WHEN YOU FORWARD THE PROGRAMME YOU INCLUDE A FORMAL WRITTEN INVITATION ADDRESSED TO THE CGS, LT. GEN. HAMMAD SHIHAB, AND SIGNED BY THE MOST SENIOR PERSON AVAILABLE.

7. OMISSION OF RAPIER FROM THE PROGRAMME WAS NOTED AND IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE RAISED. I SUGGEST THAT EVEN THE RESTRICTED DEMONSTRATION ACCOMPANIED BY AN HONEST STATEMENT ON SECURITY DIFFICULTIES AND DELIVERY DATES WOULD BE PROFITABLE.

FCO PASS TO MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

/SENT TO MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.

DEF. TR. & S.D.

26/3

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CONFIDENTIAL

40

CYPHER/CAT A.

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 9

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY.

21 MARCH 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TELNO. STOW 9 OF 21 MARCH.

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 26 MAR 1969 NEQ 10/2 |
|---|

FOR EIR 2B2. TIGERCAT. YOUR STOW 9 DATED 19TH MARCH 1969 REFERS.

1. I UNDERSTAND IRAQI M.A. IN LONDON HAS REPORTED BACK SINCE MEETING WITH SHORTS ON 7TH MARCH BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH DETAIL OR WHAT RECOMMENDATION HE HAS INCLUDED. *Copy to NEQ 10/3*
2. IF PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR IRAQI DELEGATION TO U.K. IS AGREED, THEY WILL BE VISITING SHORTS-IN BELFAST ON TUESDAY APRIL 22ND. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT ANY DECISION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE THAT DATE.
3. IRAQI INTEREST IS VERY SERIOUS AND I SUGGEST THAT HILL COULD USEFULLY VISIT BAGHDAD BETWEEN NOW AND THE VISIT OF THE DELEGATION. IF HILL COMES THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT PUTTING HIM IN TOUCH WITH THE RESPONSIBLE BRANCH AND I THINK THAT ASKING FOR AN INVITATION MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF TIME.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT HE COMES AS PROPOSED AT THE END OF MARCH TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE SIGNATURE OF A CONTRACT EITHER DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO U.K. DURING THE PROPOSED PERIOD 18TH APRIL - 1ST MAY.

MR. EVANS

/SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.

DEF. TR. & S.D.

*ru/mtt
26/3*

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Training & Supply Department**REQ 10/2****27 March, 1969****Saladin - IRAQ**

Thank you for your letter A/10/Clearances/1910 of 11 March 1969 about a possible Iraqi interest in the purchase of the Saladin.

2. As I told you this morning on the telephone the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is reluctant to commit itself until we are convinced that the definite prospect of an imminent sale to Iraq exists. It would appear that this is not yet the case and we would, therefore, prefer not to give an opinion on what is at the moment a hypothetical issue.

3. Should a definite Iraqi interest exist we will, of course, give the question full and sympathetic consideration in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Iraq is, as you know, a difficult case and I am sure that you will appreciate the reasons for our reluctance to commit ourselves until we know precisely what stage has been reached in any possible deal.

(D. J. S. MURRAY)

**A. Miller, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence,
Sales 5b(A),
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
S.E.1**

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No. *NEQ 10/2*

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

A. Miller, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence,
Sales 5b(A),
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
LONDON S.E.1

From

D. J. S. Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Saladins - IRAQ

Thank you for your letter A/10/Clearances/1910 of
11 March 1969 about a possible Iraqis interest in the
purchase of the Saladin.

2. As I told you this morning on the telephone the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office is reluctant to commit
itself until we are convinced that the definite prospect
of an imminent sale to Iraq exists. It would appear that
this is not yet the case and we would, therefore, prefer
not to give an opinion on what is at the moment a
hypothetical issue.

3. Should a definite Iraqi interest exist we will, of
course, give the question full and sympathetic consideration
in the light of the circumstances existing at the time.
Iraq is, as you know, a difficult case and I am sure that
you will appreciate the reasons for our reluctance to
commit ourselves until we know precisely what stage has
been reached in any possible deal.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Ms. Ireland
New Eastern Dept
first.*

*PMH
G A.A.K.
25/3*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

W. 241.

Mr. Acland - Near Eastern/Arabian Department

Saladins - IRAQ

I have told Mr. Miller that we are unwilling to commit ourselves about a possible Saladin deal with Iraq until we know that a definite offer is imminent. Mr. Miller accepts this; but I suspect that he was disappointed that we did not support the Army Sales view against that of the General Staff.

2. I made the point to Mr. Miller that no evidence had been brought to our notice to indicate that the Iraqis would make the Ferret sale contingent on our agreement to supply Saladins. Mr. Miller then disclosed that in fact very little evidence exists to show that the Iraqis are interested in buying Saladins.


3. I attach a draft in confirmation for your clearance.



(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training & Supply Department
21 March, 1969.

*Mr Murray to
26/3*

*Mr Acland is away this week. Your
draft seems a excellent statement on the party
line - please issue.*



NEO

25/3

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DRAFT *CABLE / *SAVINGRAM

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Date &
T.O.D.


3 / 4 / 69

Serial No. *STOW UNNUMBERED*

*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER(Name) P.F. COTSFORDRank HEOBranch EIR2C2Building STUART HOUSERoom 214 Ext. 309Date 3/4/69**COUNTERSIGNED**Signed P.F. CotsfordRank HEOBranch EIR2C2Date 3/4/69**DISTRIBUTION :—**

Originator

EIR2C**INFORMATION COPIES TO :—**US/EIRFCO Eastern DeptFCO DSTDEIR 1aEIR2bMOD DS13.File No. HU/52/0164†Priority marking: **ROUTINE**TO : PRODRONE BAGHDADFOR : DEFENCE ATTACHEFROM : MINTECH EIR HE 2CTEXT (use double spacing for cables)~~STOW 39~~

For Defence Attache from Mintech EIR2C.

Your STOWS. 1. Invitation from ~~ESX~~ US/EIR and provisional programme in today's bag.

2. Important you signal earliest confirmation of team's visit including names so that we can go firm on hotel bookings.

3. Reservations have been made for flights BA209 on 18th and return BA758 1st May. In case BOAC strike prolonged please recommend alternatives.

4. As visit ~~it~~ will involve release of classified information we will need security clearances for team. Request you advise team to put in clearances through Iraq Embassy in London.

*Passed to FCO
for transmission
at 1500*

[Signature]
NDO
3/4/69

Reg. in file
[Signature]

11/4

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

43

~~CYPHER/CAT-A~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY BAGHDAD.

TO. MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 10.

9 APRIL 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 APR 1969

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TELNO STOW 10 OF 9 APRIL RFI TO
FCO.

FOR EIR 2C FROM DEFAT. AIR DEFENCE. YOUR STOW U/N
OF 1 APRIL

| |
|-------------|
| RECEIVED |
| 11 APR 1969 |
| NEQ 10/2 |

1. INVITATION AND PROVISIONAL PROGRAMME RECEIVED. IT IS
CONFIRMED THAT TEAM WILL VISIT ON DATES QUOTED.
2. IRAQIS WOULD LIKE TEAM TO CONSIST OF MAJ GEN
SHENSHAL PLUS FIVE. TWO OF PARTY WILL JOIN TEAM IN UK
SO IT IS ASSUMED PASSAGES ALREADY AUTHORISED FOR FOUR WILL
STAND. WILL CONFIRM LATER. NAMES OF MEMBERS OF
PARTY WILL ALSO BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED.
3. FLIGHT DETAILS AS PER YOUR PARA 3 AGREED.
4. IRAQI MOD INFORMED OF NEED FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES
AND THESE WILL BE ARRANGED THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN
LONDON.

/ 5. SUGGESTED

CONFIDENTIAL

10/11/69
16/4

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. SUGGESTED ADDITION TO PROGRAMME PUT FORWARD BY GEN SHENSHAL IS THAT ON 30 APR (LAST WORKING DAY) THEY DISCUSS WITH MOD PROVISION OF AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT AND AIR FORCE TRAINING IN GENERAL.

6. GEN SHENSHAL ALSO REQUESTED GENERAL PRESENTATIONS OF OTHER EQUIPMENTS. DETAILS OF THESE TO FOLLOW.

MR. EVANS

[SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY].

S T O W DISTRIBUTION:

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

D.T.S.D.

~~SECRET~~

Action: EIR 2c

Info: US/EIR

FCO Eastern Dept

FCO DSTD

EIR 1a

EIR 2b

MOD DS 13

File: HU/52/0164

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Mr. J.R. Christie, Under Secretary/1 per/s and International
Relations Division

44

Copies to:

H.D./H.D.S.

F.C.O. (Mr. Eastern Dept.) ✓

F.C.O., D.S.T.D. (Mr. Murray)

E.I.R.1(a)

E.I.R.2(b)

Stuart House,
Soho Square,
LONDON, W.1.

3rd April, 1969.

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. TO 1111 APR 1969 NEQ 10/2 |
|---|

CONFIDENTIAL

*Mr. Adams
Mr. T. Miller has seen (AS).*

It would give us very great pleasure if you could see your way clear to allowing General Shamsah and three senior officers to visit the United Kingdom as guests of Her Britannic Majesty's Government to look at equipment which has been produced by British industry for air defence.

I am enclosing an outline programme covering aircraft, radar and missiles of the types which are either in service with the British Forces or have been provided under sponsored air defence schemes to other countries. We have drawn this programme up to give an indication of the scope of the visits and presentations which we would think would be of value to the team, but, of course, it can be modified as they may wish.

If you are able to approve the visit of General Shamsah and the three senior officers, our Embassy in Baghdad will arrange for them to be provided with return air tickets and we will make arrangements at this end for the team to be accommodated at the Savoy Hotel. I am sure they will find this hotel both comfortable and convenient to them for their visit.

J. R. CHRISTIE

Lieutenant General Hameed Shihab,
Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence,
Baghdad, IRAQ.

*Then to
other units
etc. Iraqis
...
(what has been
accepted)
for a visit to
the U.K.*

*PMWMA 2.0.0.0
11/4*

Pa PMWMA

16/4

Iraq Air Defence Mission - Provisional Programme

| | | |
|------------|-----------|--|
| 18th April | Friday. | Arrival (subject to BOAC settlement) on Flight BA209 at 16.05. Visitors will be met at London Airport by Mintech officials and escorted to Savoy Hotel. |
| 19th April | Saturday | } Free |
| 20th April | Sunday | |
| 21st April | Monday | am Official meeting with MOD/Mintech. Depart for Hawker Siddeley Aviation Dunsfold/Kingston for lunch and presentation of <u>Harrier aircraft</u> . Evening - guests of HSA. |
| 22nd April | Tuesday | am Depart London for Short Bros Belfast for presentation of Tigercat. Stay overnight as guests of Shorts. |
| 23rd April | Wednesday | am Depart Belfast for BAC Warton for presentation of <u>Lightning & BAC 167 aircraft</u> . Stay overnight as guests of BAC. |
| 24th April | Thursday | am Depart Warton for RAF Station for presentation on Lightning aircraft and computer controlled interception system (the latter aspect in association with Elliott Automation). Evening - guests of Elliott Automation. |
| 25th April | Friday | am Depart London for GEC-Marconi Electronics Chelmsford for presentation on Air Defence Ground Environment Evening - guests of GEC-Marconi. |
| 26th April | Saturday | Possibly guests of GEC-Marconi, otherwise free. |
| 27th April | Sunday | Day free. Evening travel to Isle of Wight. |
| 28th April | Monday | am Visits to British Hovercraft Corporation and Britten Norman. Plessey Radar, Cowes IOW for lunch and presentation of Air Defence Ground Environment. Evening - guests of Plessey Radar. |
| 29th April | Tuesday | am Depart London for EMI Hayes for presentation of Green Archer. pm Depart Hayes for STC Strand, for presentation of communications and airfield equipment. Evening - guests of ST&C. |
| 30th April | Wednesday | am Final meeting with Mintech/MOD followed by Official Lunch. pm Free. |
| 1st May | Thursday | Depart London Airport 12.30 hrs on Flight BA758 (subject to BOAC settlement) |

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
15 APR 1969
NEQ 10/2

CONFIDENTIAL

(45)

Reference.....

~~Mr. A. Hinchcliffe~~

You may be interested
to see what is proposed

9.1.1969

~~Mr. Tripp~~

Arms sales to Iraq

You asked this morning about the visit of
the Iraqi Air Defence Mission due to start on
18 April.

Flag A

2. Their programme is attached to Mr. Christie's
letter at p.44.

3. From the programme you will see that the
Iraqi visitors are due to have presentations of
Harrier, Tiger Cat, Lightning, BAC 167, computer-
controlled interception system, Air Defence Ground
Environment, Hovercraft, Green Archer (mortar
locating radar) and communications and airfield
equipment. It remains to be seen what the Iraqis
will order. Nor can we say at this stage what we
would be prepared to release. There is nothing
exceptionally sensitive in the list above.
Probably Harrier aircraft would be the most
difficult.

4. Mr. Hinchcliffe is satisfied that those in
the Ministry of Technology who are organising the
visit are very well aware of our general caveat
that demonstration of a particular weapon must not
be taken to imply governmental approval for its sale.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)
14 April, 1969.

cc: Mr. Hinchcliffe.

P
14
4

Mr Hinchcliffe *15/4*

We p. a. *14/4*

CONFIDENTIAL

F C O

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD

ADDSO TO MINTech TEL NO STOW 12 OF 11 APRIL REPTD FOR INFAN

FCO.

FOR EIR 2C FROM DEFAT. AIR DEFENCE. OUR STOW 10 OF 9 APRIL REFERS.

1. TEAM TO CONSIST OF SIX. COMPOSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. HEAD OF DELEGATION - MAJ GEN ABDUL JABBAR SHENSHAL.
- B. IRAQI AIR FORCE REP - LT COL HAMID SHABAN TIKRITI.
- C. FOUR OTHER MEMBERS - LT COL ADNAN AL QAISI, MAJOR FAIQ RAMADHAN, CAPT SAMIR MOHAMMAD RASHID AND CAPT TARIQ ABDUL SAHIB.

2. AS STATED IN PARA 2 OF REF, TWO MEMBERS WILL JOIN THE DELEGATION IN UK. THESE ARE LT COL TIKRITI AND CAPT SAHIB. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THESE WILL ALREADY BE IN POSSESSION OF RETURN AIR TICKETS BUT WOULD APPRECIATE IF THE POINT COULD BE CHECKED ON THEIR ARRIVAL.

3. HEAD OF DELEGATION HAS REQUESTED THAT RADAR PRESENTATIONS INCLUDE IN PARTICULAR LOW LEVEL EQUIPMENT, AND JAMMING AND ANTI-JAMMING DEVICES.

4. A FURTHER REQUEST IS FOR ANY PRESENTATION, HOWEVER GENERAL, ON JAGUAR. MY DM/604 OF 24 MARCH TO MORGAN OF BAC GIVES SOME BACKGROUND.


BT

PRIORITY

MIN OF 1241 / P sec (2)

MINTech DO sent 1034.

16/4



(46)

6091
2427
1037
EIR 2C
USLEIR
FCO Eastern Dept.
DTS
EIR 1a
EIR 2b
MOD DS 13
H4/52/0164

DRAFT *CABLE / SAVINGRAMDate &
T.O.D.

14.4.69

Serial No.

STOW 11

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REGISTRY NO. 10

16 APR 1969

NEQ 10/2

*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER(Name) J. CoatesRank CEOBranch EIR2cBuilding Stuart HouseRoom 315 Ext. 311Date 14th April 1969**COUNTERSIGNED**Signed [Signature]Rank Asst. SecretaryBranch EIR2Date 14th April 1969**DISTRIBUTION :—**

Originator

AS/EIR2**INFORMATION COPIES TO :—**US/EIRFCO - Eastern Dept.FCO - DTSDMOD - DS13EIR1AEIR2BEIR2CFile No. HU/52/0164†Priority marking: IMMEDIATETO : XXXXXX PRODROME, BAGHDADFOR : AMBASSADORFROM : GAMMON, AS/EIR2, MINTECH, LONDONTEXT (use double spacing for cables) 43 46

YOUR DEFAT TELEGRAMS STOW 10 and 12 - AIR DEFENCE.

- MEMBERS OF TEAM OTHER THAN SHENSHAL, SEEM TO BE AT LOWER LEVEL THAN INDICATED IN YOUR EARLIER TELEGRAMS. THIS IS UNFORTUNATE, IN OUR VIEW, AND WILL NOT MAKE THE NECESSARY IMPACT IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY CIRCLES HERE OR POSSIBLY IN IRAQ ON RETURN.
- INCREASE IN SIZE OF TEAM IS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO US. FIRST, WE FOUND CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING FUNDS TO MEET YOUR REQUEST FROM OUR VERY LIMITED BUDGET. SECOND, TEAM OF SIX IS TOO LARGE AND WITH ESCORTS/ INTERPRETER WILL BE UNWIELDY AND PAST EXPERIENCE OF SUCH SIZE TEAMS IS THAT AFTER FIRST DAY OR SO NOT ALL THE TEAM ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE.
- WE HAVE RESERVED HOTEL ACCOMMODATION AT SAVOY HOTEL, INCLUDING SUITE FOR SHENSHAL, FOR PARTY OF FOUR ONLY. WOULD PREFER THAT IRAQIS MAKE THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS AND ACCEPT FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDITIONAL MEMBERS BEARING IN MIND THAT OUR OFFICIAL INVITATION IS RESTRICTED TO SHENSHAL PLUS THREE.
- DO YOU CONSIDER THAT AT THIS LATE HOUR THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF PERSUADING IRAQIS TO SUBSTITUTE MORE SENIOR OFFICERS FOR PRESENT NOMINEES?
- THE PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 OF STOW 12 NOTED. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEMS.

AW P4

16/4

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

MinTech (late Avmin) Form 97 (revised April 1965)

Security Classification :

CONFIDENTIAL

From: M.A. Eastwood, Sales 5b(A)

Enter phone - 14.6.7. (48)MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone 01-928 7999, Ext 4464

REGISTRY NO. 100

17 APR 1969

NEQ 10/2

10/Clearances/1000

*Copied &
NES 10/2*

April 1969

Dear David,

We have been informed by Near East Resources Ltd., that there is a possibility of selling both the Baby Viper and Giant Viper to Syria and Iraq.

The Giant Viper is designed to blast a safe passage some twenty feet wide through a minefield of up to 200 yds in depth. It consists of 750 ft of 2½ inch diameter hose, filled with plastic explosive which is fired across a minefield by a cluster of rocket motors. The equipment is mounted on a special 2 wheel trailer capable of being towed by a tank. Baby Viper is a smaller version of Giant Viper.

The General Staff have no objections to the sale of these equipments to either Syria or Iraq. May we please have your views as to whether we may supply the equipments should an order materialize.

*Yours sincerely,**Mike Eastwood*

D.J.S. Murray Esq
Defence Training & Supply Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

*P.S. I have copied this to Joe Wade in DS 136.**M.*

Copied to
NES 10/2

W. (48)

Mr. Hindcliffe o.r. Reference
Mr. Bale } New East Dept.

Sale of "Viper" Equipment to Syria & Iraq

Please see Army Sales letter 15/ Clearances/1000
of 16 April 1969 about the claim by New East
Resources that it might be possible to sell the above
equipment to Syria and Iraq.

2. The letter well describes the function of the
equipment. Its role, however, is to assist in the
neutralisation of fixed defences such as wire and mines
and perhaps you may wish to consider this against the
present situation in the Arab-Israel area. As the letter
this equipment does not contravene the rules for the export of
arms to the Middle East and as the assumption that
you would not wish to reject I have drafted accordingly in the
case of Iraq. Syria is, of course, out.

22 Apr 69

J. J. Murray
D.T.S.D.

Mr Murray

he should.

he should not commit ourselves in
advance even a mild & reluctant unwillingness
to suggest that he should to our
best kind about "consideration when

a him order a made "etc.!"

AMH 24/8

Mr Murray

I agree with Mr. Minchcliffe. Despite our present inclination to regard the OPD paper of Nov. 67 as flexible guidelines rather than sacred writ as far as Syria is concerned, I think we wd. still ~~try to~~ refuse to approve such a sale.

RBell

WED

24/3/69.

DRAFT *CABLE / *SAVINGRAM

ORIGINAL and FOUR legible carbon copies, all on Avmin Form 97, typed (or in BLOCK CAPITALS if in manuscript) on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

Date &
T.O.D.

16.4.69

Serial No.

STOW 13

*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER(Name) P.F.COTSFORDRank HEOBranch EIR2CBuilding STUART HOUSERoom 214 Ext. 309Date 16/4/69**COUNTERSIGNED**Signed [Signature]Rank ASBranch EIR2Date 16/4/69**DISTRIBUTION :-**

Originator

EIR2C**INFORMATION COPIES TO :-**US/EIRFCO Eastern DeptFCO DTSDAS/EIR2EIR1aEIR2bDS13 MODCol Berger ODR MODFile No. HU/52/0164†Priority marking: IMMEDIATETO : HEXT PRODROME BAGHDADFOR : DEFATFROM : MINTECH EIR2TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

17 APR 1969

NEQ 10/2

For DEFAT from EIR2C Mintech.

1. Your STOW 14. Team will be met by Mr M. Gammon Assistant Secretary EIR2 representing Ministry of Technology and Colonel O. Berger representing Ministry of Defence. Escort officers during visit will include: Col. Berger; Mr J. Sheen or Mr C. Benjamin, Mr J. Coates and Mr S. Addison of EIR Division, Mintech. Subject to your approval Wing Commander Harrison AAdes. will also accompany team.
2. Air tickets will be available at BOAC office Thursday. Please arrange to collect and pass to team.

3.

Reg. 2 com me 1 L Mc Acland
1 L Plant (new)
also 5 m.
PMMH
17/4

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

**Date &
T.O.D.**

17.4.69

Serial No.

5 Tow 14

ORIGINAL and FOUR legible carbon copies, all on Avmin Form 97, typed (or in BLOCK CAPITALS if in manuscript) on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) **P.F. COTSFORD**

Rank **HEO**Branch **EIR 20**

Building **STUART HOUSE**

Room 214 Ext. 309

Date 17 APRIL 1969

COUNTERSIGNED

Signed

Rank **AS**Branch EIR2

Date **17 ABRIL 1969**

DISTRIBUTION :—

Originator **EIR2C**

INFORMATION COPIES TO :—

US/EIR

FCO Eastern Dept

FCO DTSD

AS/EIR2

EIR 1A

EIR 2B

DS 13 MOD

Col Berger ODR MOD

File No. HU-52-0164

↑Priority marking:.....**IMMEDIATE**

TO : **PRODROME BAGDAD**

FOR :..... DEFAT

FROM : MINTech EIR 2C

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

~~23 APR 1969~~

NEQ 10/2

For DEFAT from EIRM 2C MINTECH.

Further to our Stow unnumbered 3rd April,
Iraq Embassy advise that no security certification
yet received for the team. Vital we have
the required assurances before beginning of
visit.

Mr. Stewart 21/IV
1500 ft.
in about
place?
J. 17/4

Mr. Stewart 21/IV
100 ft. 20 ft.
July 4

This refers to the security standing of the members
of the Iraqi Arms Sales team currently
visiting this country. The notification has now
arrived and is being forwarded to Mr. Tarkenton.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

MinTech (late Avmin) Form 97 (revised April 1965)

Security Classification : **RESTRICTED**

DRAFT *CABLE / -SAVINGRAM-

Date &
T.O.D.

18.4.69

Serial No.

STOW 15

ORIGINAL and THREE legible carbon copies, typed on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) D.W. GORDON

Rank E.O.

Branch E.I.R. 2(C)3.

Building STUART HOUSE

Room 203 Ext. 138

Date 18th APRIL 1969.

COUNTERSIGNED

Signed [Signature]

Rank H.E.D.

Branch E.I.R. 2(C)3.

Date APRIL 1969.

DISTRIBUTION :-

Originator E.I.R. 2(C)3.

INFORMATION COPIES TO :-

US/EIR

AS/EIR 2

F.O. (D.T. 2 S.D.)

GSC(R)(SY) - BRIG SHERMAN.

File No. HU/328/07

†Priority marking:

ROUTINE.

TO : PAODROME BAGHDAD

FOR : MILITARY ATTACHE.

FROM : MINTCH. EIR 2(C)3, LONDON.

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

FOR MILITARY ATTACHE FROM GORDON, EIR 2(C)3

WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT NO ^{RELEASE} OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON CYMBELINE SHOULD BE MADE TO IRAQ. ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE GAINED REGARDING FUTURE MORTAR-LOCATING RADARS REQS. WOULD, HOWEVER, BE APPRECIATED.

J.T.S.D. have seen;

now &

Mr. Smith & Mr. [Signature]

N.E.D. please. 24/4.

[Signature] Murray

f4 PMM

24/4

2


RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
24 APR 1969
NEQ 10/2

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

*Delete as appropriate

Mr. Inpp may care to see

Mr. Acland



General Shemshal

Colonel Berger rang me up this morning. He confirmed that the visit of the Iraqi mission was now going more smoothly. Apparently General Shemshal cornered Berger and said that he would like the British to take over the training of the Iraqi armed forces - when Berger attempted to pin the General down to something more specific Shemshal became vague and it is likely that the original remark was of the "throwaway" variety and unlikely to be more than a general expression of goodwill towards his hosts. There is of course the possibility that Shemshal's English being weak (he is shy of airing it) that he could not find the words to express clearly what he really wanted to say. We agreed that if Shemshal pursued the topic again, Colonel Berger would take the line that an official request from the Iraqis for the training of military personnel by us would of course receive due consideration.

2. Colonel Berger then said that M.O.D. was giving an informal party for General Shemshal, Colonel Takriti and the Defence Attachés at (probably) the Savoy on Monday and he would like an Arabic speaking FCO officer to sit next to the General who might then be tempted to unburden himself without the restriction of having to speak in an unfamiliar tongue. I agreed to help to find a suitable Arabist and have now told Colonel Berger that Alec Ibbott of Arabian Department has consented to be the General's dinner partner on Monday evening. I doubt if the General will have anything useful to say but at least Mr. Ibbott should enjoy a pleasant evening.

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

25 April, 1969.

Copy to: Mr. Murray (DTSD)
Mr. Ibbott

We have been keeping a watch on this visit; and it is good of Mr Ibbott to sacrifice himself in this way.

Reg. M. P.M.A. 28/4

7/11/69. 28/4

M. Hinchcliffe NKD

I duly dined at the Savoy -
and had a pleasant evening.

Nothing of political or military
importance emerged from the conversation.
I was in on. Gen. Shemshal said he
was very satisfied with his programme.

Mr. Asland

General Shemshal

Desd 30.4.69

Colonel Berger rang me up this morning. He confirmed that the visit of the Iraqi mission was now going more smoothly. Apparently General Shemshal cornered Berger and said that he would like the British to take over the training of the Iraqi armed forces - when Berger attempted to pin the General down to something more specific Shemshal became vague and it is likely that the original remark was of the "throwaway" variety and unlikely to be more than a general expression of goodwill towards his hosts. There is of course the possibility that Shemshal's English being weak (he is shy of airing it) that he could not find the words to express clearly what he really wanted to say. We agreed that if Shemshal pursued the topic again, Colonel Berger would take the line that an official request from the Iraqis for the training of military personnel by us would of course receive due consideration.

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M.H.

(P.R.N. Hinchcliffe)

25 April, 1969.

Copy to: Mr. Murray (DTED)
Mr. Ibbott

Re: Jm
You can
not
la. How
P.R.N.
M.H.
2/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

53

1 May, 1969.

REQ 10/2

Please refer to your letter A/10/
Clearances/1000 of 16 April, 1969.

2. The F.C.O. would have no objection to
the supply to IRAQ of VIPER Explosive
Equipment.

3. We are not in Diplomatic Relations with
Syria, and under current policy the sale of
arms or military equipment is not
permissible.

(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

M. A. Eastwood, Esq.,
Sales 50(A),
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

c.c. J. B. Wade, Esq.,
D.S.13(b),
M.O.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

(NEQ 10/2)

~~A. Miller, Esq.,~~

M. A. Eastwood, Esq.,

~~K. W. Nutting, Esq.,~~

Sales 5b(A),
M.O.D.

Copy:

J. B. WADE Esq.,
~~Miss F. Farnsworth,~~
D.S.13(b),
M.O.D.

Please refer to your
letter A/10/Clearances/1000
of 16 APR 1969

2. The FO^d/CO would have no
objection to the supply to

IRAQ

OF VIPER EXPLOSIVE EQUIPMENT

3. We are not in
Diplomatic Relations with
Syria, and under
current policy the sale of
arms or military equipment
is not permissible.

AS/EIR.2

Meeting with Iraqi DelegationBackground

You are to take a meeting at 10.15 a.m. on Monday, 21st April, to welcome an Iraqi Defence Team headed by General Shenshal at the start of a programme of visits to our firms. The members of the team are set out in Annex A, and the scope of the programme is described at Annex B.

At Annex.C are notes on the various equipments covered by the visit, and topics in which the Iraqis have expressed an interest. In addition, at the last minute, the Iraqis have expressed an interest in Cymbeline and reconnaissance vehicles, and, though the former is ruled out on security grounds, the General has said that he would be interested in a demonstration of Ferret, even working over the weekend to have one.

Also, the Iraqis have expressed a wish to discuss the openings for training their personnel with the R.A.F., and, although a date has been arranged, it would be helpful if General Shenshal and his staff could indicate initially the scope of topics they would like to cover.

The general background to arms sales to Iraq is one where there are political restrictions imposed by the Middle East situation, and security limitations arising from the substantial penetration of the Russians into the Iraqi military machine. Thus all sales cases arising out of this visit are going to require at least political clearance: only Tigercat has so far been approved for supply, though defence radar and electronics, hovercraft, and transport aircraft should be reasonably clear of problems. Certain equipments, e.g. Cymbeline and Jaguar are unlikely to be cleared for supply for some years. In the middle of this spectrum are a band of equipments, such as Lightning and Harrier, where the decision to supply may depend largely upon the scale of an order. It would be useful, therefore, to get over to the team that our preparedness to supply much of the equipment in which the Iraqis may be interested will depend upon how much they want.

Judging by general indications, the Iraqi Defence Budget is under pressure: this is inevitably going to throw the emphasis upon credit terms. This, in turn, is liable to give the Russians and French (there is a twelve-strong team of Iraqis currently in France, probably examining the French competitors to our equipments) an edge, since they both adopt the practice of stretching credit beyond commercial limits under the pretext of aid.

Direction of Meeting

1. It should be explained in introducing the meeting that the programme represents equipment which is available and in production. Whilst from a sales angle and to secure better relations we hope they will be impressed with what they see, they should appreciate that there are some equipments which are restricted for supply to overseas customers because of their timing for being in service with our own Services, and, in any event, the Government will have to approve the supply of any equipments in which Iraq are interested. It could be added that the view taken by the Government will be influenced by the scale of any order and the type of equipments involved.
2. The team should be taken through the programme, and their views sought on any adjustments. These should not be too radical.

/3.

3. It would be useful to glean out of this discussion whether there are any particular equipments in which they are interested or have queries so that these can be followed through in the course of the visit.
4. They should be asked to indicate what types of R.A.F. training they are interested in, so that these can be examined for the subsequent meeting.
5. NOTE: There is a tight timetable for the remainder of the day, and the team should move off promptly from M.O.D. at 11.30 a.m.

C. Benjamin

(C. B. Benjamin)

Mintech.
EIR.1(a)
Room 305,
Stuart House
437-9288, Ext. 105
17th April, 1969

Distribution: Ministry of Defence - VCGS
HDS
MD/HDS
Col. Berger, ODR.
DS.13
DS.8a:
Ops(P)2b(RAF)

Min. of Technology - AS/EIR.1
EIR.1(a)
EIR.2(b)
EIR.2(c)

Foreign Office

Near Eastern Dept. ←
DTSD.

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

Major General Abdul Jabbar Shenshal, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Iraq

Lieutenant Colonel Hamib Shaban Tikriti

Lieutenant Colonel Adnan Al Qaisi

Major Faiq Ramadhan

Captain Samir Mohammad Rashid

Captain Tariq Abdul Sahib

The team will be accompanied by:-

Colonel Saadoon Abdul - Razzak Hilmy, Military Attaché, Iraq Embassy

Colonel Kamal Mahmood Al - Azzawi, Air Attaché, Iraq Embassy

Wing Commander H. Harrison, Air Attaché Designate, British Embassy, Baghdad

Escort Officers include:-

Mr. M.M.J. Gammon, AS/E.I.R.2, Ministry of Technology

Colonel O.C. Berger, Ministry of Defence

Mr. C.B. Benjamin, EIR 1(a), Ministry of Technology

Mr. J. Coates, EIR 2, Ministry of Technology

Mr. S. Addison, EIR 2, Ministry of Technology

Outline of ProgrammeFriday, 18 April, 1969

General Shenshal and party met at London Airport - 1605 hrs.

Saturday, 19 April, 1969

Entertained by B.A.C.

Sunday, 20 April, 1969

Free.

Monday, 21 April, 1969

MOD/Mintech. meeting.

Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd., Dunsfold - Harrier.

Tuesday, 22 April, 1969

Short Bros. & Harland, Ltd., Belfast - Tigercat and Skyvan.

Wednesday, 23 April, 1969

British Aircraft Corporation, Ltd., Warton - Lightning, BAC.167 and Jaguar.

Thursday, 24 April, 1969

R.A.F., Wattisham - Lightning and application of computer control to interception - in association with Elliott Automation.

Friday, 25 April, 1969

GEC/Marconi (Electronics) Ltd., Chelmsford - Air defence ground environment.

Saturday, 26 April, 1969

Guests of GEC/Marconi (Electronics) Ltd.

Sunday, 27 April, 1969

Britten Norman, Ltd., Isle of Wight - BN.2 Islander.

Monday, 28 April, 1969Plessey, Isle of Wight - Air defence ground environment.
British Hovercraft Corporation - Hovercraft presentation (at Plesseys).Tuesday, 29 April, 1969EMI Electronics - Green Archer
S.T. & C. - Communications and airfield equipment.Wednesday, 30 April, 1969MOD/Mintech. meetings.
Official lunch.Thursday, 1 May, 1969

General Shenshal and party depart for Iraq.

DETAILED ITINERARY FOR EACH DAY IS SHOWN OVERLEAF.

Visit of Iraqi Delegation
18.4.69 - 1.5.69

A I R C R A F T

British Aircraft Corporation Ltd.

(1) Lightning

General

Following a visit by an Iraqi Air Force delegation at the time of the SBAC Air show last September, during which certain of the officers flew the Lightning at B.A.C., Warton, B.A.C. submitted a proposal based on their understanding of the Iraqi requirement for 40 aircraft (36 single seater Mk. 53s and 4 two-seater Mk. 55s).

It is B.A.C.'s understanding - based on reports from their agent in Baghdad, Brigadier Abadi - that approval to a Lightning purchase has been given by the Central Committee of the Ba'ath Party and the Council of Ministers: this has not been confirmed by an official approach to our Embassy or direct to the firm. The report from B.A.C.'s agent, following the January/February events in Iraq, was, however, that the Ba'ath Government did not wish at that time to risk any leak of a deal with B.A.C. The current Iraqi visit may indicate a change in this situation.

Political Aspects

So far, the firm's proposals have been put forward without prejudice to HMG approval to the supply of Lightnings in the event of the Iraqis confirming their intention to purchase. The HMG attitude is that approval to supply Lightnings to Iraq cannot be given at this stage. Ministers would have to consider this proposal at the time that the Iraqi intention to purchase became firmer, when the political situation in the Middle East, trade and credit terms required by the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government's present attitude towards the Iraq Petroleum Co. would all have to be taken into account.

Lightning Production Line

B.A.C. recently approached Mintech. to seek assistance to finance the continuation of the production line on a limited basis. The advantages of an Iraqi order would be:-

- (a) the continuation of the Lightning production line and the staving off of a production crisis in B.A.C.;
- (b) the gain of an eventual £100 million in foreign exchange, with the commercial and employment benefits flowing from orders of this scale;
- (c) keeping open the prospect of gaining further orders from, for example, Argentina, Morocco and Greece, and enabling replacement aircraft to be supplied to Saudi and Kuwait without difficulty.

(ii) B.A.C.167

There is a long-standing requirement for 20 Czech L.29 and 10 L.39 replacement aircraft. An Iraqi Major flew the BAC.167 during the September, 1968 visit to Warton and B.A.C. will take the opportunity to present this aircraft during the current visit.

(iii) Jaguar

Interest was shown by General Hardan Tikriti, Minister of Defence, during the B.A.C. sales tour in August, 1968. Despite potential political difficulties, Iraq are cleared to receive information up to Restricted and BAC will be making a presentation up to this level.

Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd.

Harrier

Hawker Siddeley Aviation was included in the Iraqi visit programme in September, 1968, however, the Iraqis turned down the visit, ostensibly on the grounds that they had obtained sufficient information on this aircraft from the firm at the S.B.A.C. Air Show. Hawkers contacts in Iraq suggest a good prospect of sales.

Short Bros. & Harland Ltd.

Skyvan

Although there is no known Iraqi requirement for an aircraft of this type, the opportunity will be taken during the Iraqi visit to Shorts on Tigercat to demonstrate the Skyvan - probably by flying the party from Belfast to B.A.C. Warton.

Britten-Norman Ltd.

BN.2 Islander

A presentation of this aircraft will be given.

General

Helicopters

Westlands are submitting proposals for bringing three Iraqi Wessexes up to standard: there is a long-term prospect of further purchases of this helicopter.

A flight in an R.A.F Wessex is being arranged.

HS.125

This aircraft will transport the party from London to Short Bros. at Belfast.

AIR DEFENCE GROUND ENVIRONMENTBackground

Our knowledge of the Iraqi Air Defence requirement dates back to July 1963 when interest was aroused in equipment available in the UK discussions between the British Air Attache in Baghdad and the IAF Commander of the existing Soviet radar system in Iraq.

The main UK manufacturers of heavy radar at that time AEI, Marconi and Decca were notified of the interest in August 1963 when it was understood the requirement was for four radar stations worth up to £10M. This would involve replacing much of the existing Russian system which was felt to be unsatisfactory from the operational point of view.

Negotiations on a joint basis by Decca (now Plessey) and Marconi were undertaken until at the end of 1964 security difficulties with the Marconi radar made it necessary to draw in AEI (now GEC) to provide the radar element, namely the 3D series 40 radar which they were developing commercially. This radar has since been sold to Saudi Arabia.

In June 1965 arrangements were made for the IAF Commander, Brigadier Razzaq to visit RRE to see prototype 3D radar built by AEI to demonstrate this type of system. Negotiations were set back in September 1965 when a new Commander was appointed, Brigadier Hilmi. In December 1965 due to economic difficulties it became clear that the project would not be re-opened for some time.

As a result of the June War 1967 and the break in diplomatic relations between Iraq and the UK, no further discussions on the air defence requirements were undertaken. However, immediately diplomatic relations were reestablished, discussions were re-opened between the Iraq Air Force and the Marconi Company, initially on communications, namely an HF system to link their military stations. This contract was successfully concluded in December 1968 at a value of £.7M. The IAF have requirements for further communications equipment including troposcatter and Marconis are in a favourable position to secure such follow-on orders.

On the radar side, although no formal approaches have been made by the IAF to re-open the earlier negotiations for a radar ground environment, the requirement still exists. The Marconi-Plessey-AEI joint approach has been replaced by two separate proposals, Marconi and AEI (now GEC) carrying on with the 40 Series 3D radar solution, with a display and data handling system based on the Myriad computer on similar lines to that designed for Saudi Arabia. The equipment concerned is primarily private venture development, the only classified element being the Series 40 radar which is Restricted. Plessey Radar are now following up the requirement independently.

As a separate exercise, the Iraqis are studying the application of a computer control system to their existing air defence environment. Elliott Automation, also now a member of the GEC-Marconi Electronics group have been asked by the Iraq Ministry of Defence to prepare a system proposal based on their 920 computer.

Although the supply of an Air Defence ground environment was approved for supply by UK industry in 1966/67, on the basis of the Series 40 radar with associated display, data handling and communications equipment, it will be necessary to confirm on account of the time lapse, the supply of such a system which may be defined during the course of any new negotiations.

GUIDED WEAPONS

Air Defence

Since the beginning of this year the Iraqis have shown marked interest in British Air Defence guided weapons particularly Rapier, Thunderbird and Tigercat (in that order of priority). Iraq has, however, a low security rating and the U.K. are committed to provide assistance to Kuwait for some time to come. For these reasons the Iraqis cannot be allowed to have either Rapier or Thunderbird within the foreseeable future. The same problems do not apply to Tigercat, however, and approval has been obtained for the release of restricted information and eventual supply.

Col. Hilmy, the Iraqi Military Attache in London visited EIR.2 at the beginning of March to enquire the approximate prices and delivery dates of the various missiles mentioned above and associated radars. On Rapier and Thunderbird development and production reasons were given as an explanation of our inability to supply in a reasonable time frame - post 1975 was mentioned for Rapier. The discussion at this meeting concentrated, therefore, on Tigercat. In addition Short Bros and Harland Ltd.'s representative Mr. Peter Hill also had talks with Col. Hilmy in London early in March and submitted quotations for the supply of Tigercat; at the end of March Mr. Hill visited Baghdad and had further talks with Gen. Shenshal.

In the discussions in Baghdad with Gen. Shenshal it was understood by Mr. Hill that the Iraqis may be prepared to sign a contract for Tigercat during their forthcoming visit to London. If this is true our attempts to divert their embarrassing interest in Rapier and Thunderbird may have succeeded.

Air-to-Air Weapons Red Top

The Iraqi Government have asked BAC to start detailed contract negotiations for the supply of 40 Lightning aircraft and associated armament.

The total order is worth more than £50M immediately and might rise to £100M taking into account possible orders for spares and servicing. The Red Top content which is thought to be for 24 Red Top packs and 100 plus missiles is estimated to be worth £4M.

At the ESC(0) meeting of 20th January 1969 the question of the supply of Lightning together with associated armaments was raised. After discussion it was agreed that a revised paper, taking into account the points made in discussion, should be resubmitted to the ESC(0). This paper is being prepared by EIR.1

Approval to release Col. 3 Confidential Red Top information has been given.

Anti tank weapons

The Iraqis have shown interest in Vigilant and Swingfire.

The Army Department were consulted November 1968 on possible supply of Vigilant but they objected on operational grounds since if sold to the Iraqis it would give them an improved anti-tank capability which was inadvisable as the Kuwaiti armoured elements were not yet strong enough to face such a capability. Army Department have been asked to reconsider this matter and we await their reply.

Mr. Davidson

Mr. Crosthwait

Mr. Acland - Near Eastern Department

Reference: E. 100/1

REG. 100/1

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Visit of Iraqi Arms Purchasing Delegation

I attended a meeting this morning at 10.30 in the Ministry of Defence at which the chair was taken by Mr. Gammon of EIR2. The meeting was attended by General Shenshal and the complete Iraqi Delegation. Interested departments of M.O.D. and Mintech were also represented.

2. The meeting was held to discuss the programme which I attach.

3. The Iraqi team on arrival had expressed interest in the Swingfire Anti Tank Guided Weapon, the Ferret Armoured Car and the 120 mm recoil-less gun ammunition. Mr. Gammon opened the meeting by explaining that these fresh interests had raised many problems for his department. The programme had already given much trouble to arrange and he was doubtful whether it would be possible to amend it to give the Delegation an opportunity to see what they wished of these additional items. The Delegation in addition expressed a wish to discuss Air Force training, principally basic flying training, but also supporting technical skills. The Air Force Representative explained that this raised very difficult problems, that there was little spare capacity in the training organisation, and that it would, of course, be essential for the trainees to be fluent in English. The Delegation replied that they naturally understood this and would make their own arrangements to have candidates tested in Iraq by the British Military Defence Attache.

4. When the meeting had been in progress for some time the Army Sales Representative arrived. He was asked to comment on the request to see the Ferret Armoured Car fitted with Swingfire. He explained that this would be very difficult because the weapon could only be fired at Bovington and this would take up a whole day. He said that the Army could not contemplate demonstrating the weapon on a Saturday. The Delegation then pointed out that they had seen a Ferret in the Territorial Army Parade in London yesterday. The Army Sales Representative undertook to examine the possibility of demonstrating the vehicle nearer London.

5. The Delegation asked for some free time in London to clear their own minds about what they, themselves, wanted to see and, I think, the properties of the equipment which was to be demonstrated. It was explained to them that this would be very difficult but after much discussion half a day was made available for this purpose. The General commented that there seemed to have been little point in holding a meeting to discuss amendments to the programme if it was in fact impossible for the programme to be amended.

6. I am sorry to have to say that my impression of the meeting was that its tone could only appear discouraging to the Delegation and that in my view the whole approach to the problem was wrong bearing in mind that we had invited them to come and that this was the first Delegation from Iraq for some time. I am aware that Mintech had been asked to play down the impression that the Iraqis would be allowed to buy all the equipment which

CONFIDENTIAL

/they

they saw. But one would have hoped that this might be done rather more indirectly. It was extremely difficult for both sides to understand each other. No qualified interpreter was present and although Col. Tikriti speaks reasonable English, I felt that on several occasions, he did not really understand what we were driving at. The General, himself, made some interjections which gave the impression that he speaks more English than he was prepared to admit but here again I do not think he understood certain of the terms which were freely banded about and connotations in English which are not readily apparent.

7. I got the impression, perhaps wrongly, that there may be fewer & more; I certainly feel that we should keep in touch with the delegates with a view to seeing the situation should things continue in this way.

D. J. S. Murray

(D. J. S. Murray)

Defence Training & Supply Department

21 April, 1969.

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

Visit of

Major General Abdul Jabbar Shamsi

Deputy Chief of The General Staff, Iraq

and Team

18th April - 1st May 1969

RESTRICTED

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

Major General Abdul Jabbar Shenshal, Deputy Chief
of the General Staff, Iraq.

Lieutenant Colonel Hamid Shaban Tikriti

Lieutenant Colonel Adnan Al Qaisi

Major Faiq Ramadhan

Captain Samir Mohammad Rashid

Captain Tariq Abdull Sahib

The team will be accompanied by

Colonel Saadoon Abdul-Razzak Hilmy,
Military Attaché, Iraq Embassy

Colonel Kamal Mahmood Al-Azzawi,
Air Attaché, Iraq Embassy

Wing Commander H. Harrison, Air Attaché Designate,
British Embassy, Baghdad

Escort Officers Include:-

| | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Mr. M.M.J. Gammon | AS/EIR2 Ministry of Technology |
| Colonel O. Berger | Ministry of Defence |
| Mr. C. Benjamin | EIRI Ministry of Technology |
| Mr. J. Sheen | " " " " |
| Mr. J. Coates | EIR2 Ministry of Technology |
| Mr. S. Addison | " " " " |

Friday 18th April, 1969

Major General Shenshal and party will arrive by flight BA 209 at London (Heathrow) Airport at 16.05. To be met by Mr. M.M.J. Gammon, Assistant Secretary, Exports and Internal Relations Division, Ministry of Technology, and Colonel O. Berger, Ministry of Defence, in the Alcock and Brown Suite.

Depart by car for Savoy Hotel

Saturday 19th April

Sunday 20th April

Free from official engagements.

Monday 21st April

- 09.45 Depart Savoy Hotel for Ministry of Defence (North entrance). To be met by Colonel O. Berger.
- 10.00 Call on Vice Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Victor Fitzgeorge-Balfour.
- 10.15 Call on Head of Defence Sales, Mr. R. Brown.
- 10.30 Discussion with representatives of Ministry of Technology and Ministry of Defence.
- 11.30 Depart Ministry of Defence by car for Battersea Heliport. Helicopter to Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd., Dunsfold.
- 12.30 Presentation by H.S.A. Ltd. on Harrier aircraft.

16.15 Depart Dunsfold for Savoy.

20.00 Dinner Party as guests of Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. Cars to be provided by H.S.A. Ltd.

Tuesday 22nd April

07.45 Depart Savoy Hotel by car for Hatfield Aerodrome.

09.00 Depart Hatfield by HS 125 aircraft for Belfast.

Presentations by Short Bros. on Tigercat and Skyvan aircraft.

Stay overnight as guests of Shorts.

Wednesday 23rd April

10.00 Depart Belfast by Skyvan for Warton.

10.30 Presentations by EAC on Lightning, BAC 167 and Jaguar aircraft.

Stay overnight as guests of BAC.

Thursday 24th April

09.00 Depart Warton by BAC aircraft for RAF Wattisham (Station Commander Group Captain R.D. Austen-Smith) for presentations on Lightning aircraft.

Presentation on the applications of computer control to interception, in association with Elliott Automation.

16.30 Depart Wattisham by car for return to Savoy Hotel.

20.30 Evening as guests of Elliott Automation.

Friday 25th April

09.15 Depart Savoy by car for Liverpool Street Station

10.00 Train to Chelmsford; by Marconi cars to establishment.

11.00 Presentation on air defence ground environment by GEC/Marconi (Electronics) Ltd. at Chelmsford.

16.20 Depart Chelmsford for Savoy Hotel.
Evening as guests of Marconi.

Saturday 26th April

Guests of GEC/Marconi (Electronics) Ltd. in afternoon for FA Cup Final.

Sunday 27th April

Morning free.

14.00 Depart Savoy Hotel by car for Waterloo Station.

- 14.30 Train to Southampton and on to Cowes by Hovercraft as guests of Plessey Radar Ltd. arriving at 16.20
- 16.50 Presentation by Britten Norman on Islander aircraft, at Bembridge.
- Stay overnight as guests of Plessey Radar at the Gloster Hotel, Cowes.
-

Monday 28th April

- 08.45 Depart Hotel for Plessey establishment. Transport to be provided by Plessey Radar for Presentation on air defence ground environment by Plessey Radar.
- 15.30 Presentation (at Plesseys) by British Hovercraft Corporation.
- 16.30 Depart Cowes for London.
- Evening free
-

Tuesday 29th April

- 10.15 Depart Savoy Hotel by car for Hayes.
- 11.00 Presentation by EMI Electronics on Green Archer.
- 14.00 Depart Hayes by car for STC House Strand.
- 15.00 Presentation by Standard Telephones and Cables of communications and airfield equipment.
- Evening as guests of ST & C.

Wednesday 30th April

- 10.15 Depart Savoy Hotel by car for Ministry of Defence.
- 10.30 Discussions with Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Technology; including an official lunch with Mr. J. Christie US/EIR, Ministry of Technology.
-

Thursday 1st May

- 11.30 Depart Savoy Hotel for London (Heathrow) airport for flight BA 758 to Baghdad.
-

NOTES

1. Lounge suits will be appropriate throughout the visit except that IAF officers may choose to wear uniform for the visit to the RAF Station.
 2. Except as otherwise stated in the programme, cars will be provided by Ministry of Technology.
-

Addresses and Telephone Numbers

Telephone Number

The Savoy Hotel,
The Strand,
London, W.C.2.

01-836 4343

Iraq Embassy,
21-22 Queen's Gate,
London, S.W.7.

01-584 7141

Ministry of Technology,
Exports and International Relations
Division,
Stuart House,
23-25 Soho Square,
London, W.1.

01-437 9288
Ext. 309/310

CONFIDENTIAL
Reference.....


| | |
|---|------------|
| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -5 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/2 | 14 (55) |
|---|------------|

Mr. Acland - Near Eastern Department

You will wish to see Mr. Murray's rather depressing report below. It is a pity that this high-level mission seems to have got off to such a bad start.

2. Part of the difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that the Ministry of Technology did not provide an Arabic interpreter for this first meeting. If one of your Arabic-speaking officers could spare the time, it seems to me that it might make a good impression if he were to call fairly soon to enquire after the welfare of the party and find out whether they are now satisfied with the programme.

3. There will no doubt be an opportunity of reviewing with the Ministry of Technology in due course the outcome of the visit and of drawing the appropriate lessons. I would have thought one would be that parties of this kind should be accompanied by a member of the Embassy staff (the Defence Attaché or his Assistant) who knows the individuals concerned and can speak their language.



(T. L. Crosthwait)
Defence Training & Supply Department
21 April, 1969.



CONFIDENTIAL

Reference



4.55

Mr. A. L. L.

I agree that a F.C.O. interest show
of interest in the progress of the visit would
not go amiss - rather than one of an
"Arlie speaking officers" down to the
Savoy to talk in (my case) bedroom
South Arlie Arlie to General Stambol I
suggest that David Murray - this is off all
a D.T.S.D. officer - call on Colonel
Talbot, who speaks reasonably English and
ask off the mission.

I mention the attached because that
the Mission will be in London tomorrow evening
at again on Tuesday evening. Time indeed is
limited as the ^{date} must be met against and
a call.

PLM H. H. H.

24/4/11

1. I had a long talk with Colonel Berger (M.O.D.) who is one of the conducting officers. He has the impression that things are going a good deal better and that the visitors now realize that much trouble has been taken on their behalf. He was seeing Gen. Shenshal to night (the party have altered the programme to have an extra day in London) and he would sound out the ground. He promised to let me know if he sensed a bad atmosphere & thought that something should be done.

2. The General is giving a reception at the Iraqi residence on 30 April.

3. No further action till we hear from Col. Berger.

24
4

H. Hinchcliffe

PP

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No.

DRAFT

letter

Type 1 +

W. 56.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

H.E. Mr. T.E. Evans,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

From

J.P. Tripp
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Near Eastern

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter (3/4) of 3 May in which you described, inter alia, General Takriti's rather cryptic remarks on military purchases.

2. I must confess that I am slightly puzzled at the General's attitude. He must surely know of General Shenghal's visit at the head of a delegation which was ~~trying~~ touring this country as our guests, with, we understood, the sole object of exploring the possibility of purchasing British air defence equipment, in which we were led to understand the Iraqis were displaying a keen interest. ^{Are} we now take it that this visit is regarded by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence ^{as} a waste of time or is ~~it~~ ^{being} ~~imagined~~ ^{IGNORED} as having never taken place at all? British firms and the Ministry of Technology (who went to some lengths to make the visit a success) will rapidly become disillusioned with the Iraqis if they feel that their efforts in making suitable arrangements for such visits are a complete waste of time.

3. We would of course be delighted to see General Takriti in this country and it would be useful if we could have some idea of his probable intentions as regards military purchases before he comes. (Incidentally, I have seen a report that he is intending to clinch an arms deal with the Russians during his current visit to Moscow.) If he is coming

/as

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

as a follow up to the Shenghal visit then the firms and Ministries concerned could be warned to be on their toes to reinforce the favourable impression that they could be assumed to have made on the air defence delegation but if he is merely on what could be described as a general " *Sum* " then we will not need to go out of our way to *Lay on* anything special (apart from the normal courtesies) in the way of *Receptions* or high powered visits to firms and defence establishments. In short if he means business "Ahlan Wa Sahalan" if not, well it is nice to see him anyway but we need not take him too seriously!

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

Near Eastern Department,

57

12 May, 1969

Visit of General Shenshal

No doubt the Defence Attaché will be getting a report from the Ministry of Technology about the visit of General Shenshal and his team, and you will be in touch with them following their return to discover how things went. You may however like to have a brief supplementary report from here.

2. The Ministry of Technology were extremely hard pressed at the time with a very heavy programme of other visits but nonetheless laid on a programme to cover most or all of the items originally suggested. The General and his team duly arrived on 18 April and on the following Monday, 21 April, there was a briefing meeting to discuss the programme. I heard from one of the Ministry of Defence officials who was acting as conducting officer to the visiting team that this had not gone very well. There had been a failure of communication through inadequate interpretation and the Ministry of Technology (not unreasonably perhaps in view of the shortage of notice) showed resistance to making any alterations in the programme or to adding new items. I think that the Iraqis would have accepted the difficulties if they had been put over rather more tactfully, but at one point General Shenshal said that he could not see the point of having the briefing meeting at all if there was no possibility of making any adjustments to the programme. Thereafter things obviously went better and the General and his team began to realise that a good deal of trouble had been taken both by the Ministry of Technology and by the firms concerned to lay on the sort of programme which they wanted. They were certainly impressed by some of the equipment which they saw although it remains to be seen whether any firm orders will be placed. Unfortunately most interest seems to have been expressed in Jaguar-Swingfire, and it would be very difficult to get approval for the supply of these.

3. We tried to ensure that both the Ministry of Technology and the Ministry of Defence should make clear in a tactful way that the demonstration of a particular weapon did not necessarily imply governmental approval to supply it if a firm order were placed. We thought it right to get this point across so that there would be no misunderstanding. As you know, it is not easy to strike the balance between encouraging arms sales and ensuring that hopes of subsequent supply are not unrealistically raised. Subsequent disappointment and charges of bad faith can be avoided if the points about security, timings of deliveries and the need for governmental approval are put tactfully, in the right way, and at the right time.

/ 4. ...

P. McKearney, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Baghdad

CONFIDENTIAL

4. General Shenshal at one stage left the impression with the Ministry of Defence escorting officer that he would be interested in having British assistance in training the Iraqi Army. It was not clear what he had in mind or whether this was a serious request. Since his English is not very good we thought it worth arranging for Alec Ibbott from Arabian Department, as a fluent Arabic speaker, to attend a very informal dinner with the General so that the latter could develop his ideas or make any additional political comment if he felt so inclined. He did not; and as we had suspected there did not seem to be any serious intent behind his original remark.

5. I attended a farewell lunch given by the Ministry of Technology for the General and his team and the atmosphere seemed quite friendly although none of the party were notable conversationalists.

56 6. At our end we will be considering with the Ministry of Technology the value of this visit and it would be useful in due course to have your own assessment. One cannot help but feel apprehensive about the rather haphazard way in which the Iraqis seem to organise their purchasing policy, and one has an uneasy suspicion that some of the activity is merely to get a free ride and free hotel accommodation (see for example paragraph 2 of the Defence Attaché's Baghdad telegram Stow unnumbered to Ministry of Technology dated 7 May). In this connection it seems rather surprising that in his conversation with the Ambassador (his letter 3/4 of 3 May to Peter Tripp) General Takriti, in the context of arms purchases, made no reference whatsoever to the visit of his Deputy Chief of Staff which had only just taken place. Does this mean that Takriti is not really serious about his own intention to buy arms (we note that he is going to Moscow and may well get some from there) or does it imply that there is little or no co-ordination between him and his Deputy Chief of Staff.

7. As you know, visits can take hours to prepare and to deal with when they take place. There is an ever increasing flow from all parts of the world and we and other Ministries have to be selective. We appreciate the importance which you attach to keeping lines open to the Iraqis but we must be sure that the payment of air fares, hotel accommodation and the general cost of a programme are justified in terms of what Britain gets out of it. We hope therefore that you and the Defence Attaché will apply very critical criteria before recommending expenditure from public funds. This is not to say that we do not think that General Shenshal's visit was worthwhile although it has yet to be shown that it has paid a dividend.

8. And we will look to you for guidance about how to handle General Takriti's visit, if it comes off. We would like to have as much warning as possible if things have to be laid on, and if

/for example...

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for example he intends to follow up some aspects of General Shenshal's visit with the Ministries and the firms involved. We can arrange the normal courtesies, but if he is coming privately for a medical check-up, you may think that nothing more should be offered. Please let us know if you can get any firm indications at your end of what would be appreciated.

(A. A. Asland)

Pa 

128

CONFIDENTIAL

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Registry
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

P. McKearney, Esq.,
BAGHDAD.

From

A. Acland

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Near Eastern

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

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/comment

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(see for example paragraph ~~Two~~ ^{Two} of telegram ~~ST&W UNNUMBERED TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY DATED 7 MAY~~ ^{Baghdad} ~~and~~ ^{and} In this connection it seems rather surprising that in his conversation with the Ambassador (his letter ~~..3/4..~~ ^{..3/4..} of ~~..3.....~~ ^{..3 May...} to Peter Tripp) General Takriti, in the context of ~~wishing to make~~ arms purchases, made no reference whatsoever to the visit of his Deputy Chief of Staff which had only just taken place. Does this mean that Takriti is not really serious about his own intention to buy arms (we note that he is going to Moscow and may well get some from there) or does it imply that there is little or no co-ordination between him and ~~Stanshale~~ ^{Stanshale} his Deputy Chief of Staff.

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/to


NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

the Defence
Attache's

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8. And we will look to you for guidance about how to handle General ^[TAKRITI] Takriti's visit, if it comes off. We would like to have as much warning as possible if things have to be laid on, & if for example he intends to follow up some aspects of General Shenshal's visit. We can arrange the normal courtesies, but if he is coming privately for a medical check-up, you may think that nothing more should be offered. Please let us know if you can get any firm indications at your end of what would be appreciated.

(with the Ministries & the firms involved)

 12/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Please enter LA of B May 1969
From K.W. Nutting Sales 5 b (A)

58



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Tel. 01-928 7999 Extn. 4237

Our ref A/10/Clearances/2297 RECEIVED IN 12th May 1969

REGISTRY No.

14 MAY 1969

NEQ 10/2

Dear Stephenson

I write to record our telephone conversation today when I informed you that the Iraqis are showing considerable interest in the Plotter Fire Control FBA (an instrument used with field artillery) and that the Fidelity Instrument Co. wish to demonstrate this equipment to the Iraqi Military Attache on 16th May.

You raised no objections to this on the understanding that any order resulting from the demonstration would, of course, be subject to an Export Licence being granted.

Yours sincerely,

K.W. Nutting

A.D.G. Stephenson Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office DT & SD

Copy to J.B. Wade Esq., MOD DS13b

From: K.W. Nutting Sales 5b(A)

CC

Please enter *[initials]*

(59)

Telephone: 01-925 7999, Ext 4237

Our ref: AD/D Sales(A)54/38/1

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED REGISTRY 14 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/2 May 1969 |
|---|

We have been informed by the Defence Attache Baghdad that the Iraqi Air Force have a requirement for "Flare Helicopter Ground Illuminating No 1 Mk 2". This mark is not yet available but we may be able to supply Mk 1 from stock. We understand that the requirement is likely to be for some thousands.

Have you any objections to the supply of these flares please.

Yours sincerely,

A.D.G. Stephenson
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
DT & SD

Copy to: J.B. Wade Esq, MOD DS13(b)

59a.

Defence Training & Supply Dept.

NEQ 10/2

20 May 1969

Please refer to your letter
AD/D Sales(A) 54/38/1 of 7 May 1969.

The F. and C.O. would have no
objection to the supply to Iraq of Flare
Helicopter Ground Illuminating No1. Mk1.

(A.D.G. Stephenson)

K.W. Nutting, Esq.,
Ministry of Defense.

Copy to: J.B. Wade, Esq.,
M.O.D.

DRAFT

(NEQ 10/2)

~~A. Miller, Esq.,~~

~~M. A. Eastwood, Esq.,~~

K. W. Nutting, Esq.,

Sales 5b(A),
M.O.D.

Copy:

J.B. WADE Esq

~~Miss P. Farnsworth,~~

D.S.13(b),

M.O.D.

Please refer to your
AD/D Sales(A)54/38/1
letter ~~10/10/69~~
of ? MAY 1969

2. The ~~FO~~^{and} CO would have no
objection to the supply to

IRAB

of Flare Helicopter
Ground Illuminating No 1
MX 1.

19 May

W. 59.

Reference.....

Wt P.R.M. ~~Handwritten~~ Kilipfe
Near ~~East~~ Dept.

Please see ESQ, do you have
any objection please?

~~CO. 1st~~

15 May DTSD

no objection ~~✓~~

P.M. Handwritten

15/5

Sept 19/5

AIR ATTACHÉ
TO THE
EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ.

22, QUEEN'S GATE,

LONDON, S.W.7.

584
01-548 7141.



سيفارة الجبهة الجوية العراقية
E85/2
60

رئاسة البعث العربي

لنذكر

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
10 MAY 1969

April, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ministry of Defence
Metropole Buildings
Northumberland Avenue
London W.C.2.

For the attention of Wing Commander
R.B. Lord, AFC

| | |
|------------|---------|
| MINIST... | DEFENCE |
| L. 3 | 971 |
| 5 MAY 1969 | |
| FILE | 5/2 |

General Shanshall the Deputy Chief of Staff leading the Iraqi delegation invited by the Ministry of Technology has requested that the following training requirement for the Iraqi Air Force be presented to you.

1. Basic Flying Training 25 vacancies
2. Pilot Attack Instructors 4 vacancies
3. Flying Instructors 4 vacancies
4. Instrument Rating Instructors 4 vacancies
5. Fighter Controller 6 vacancies
6. Traffic Controllers 12 vacancies
7. Engineering at (Henlow) College 2 vacancies.

be

I hope these requirements will be accommodated and we look forward for a reply at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully,

Azzawi
Col. K. Al-Azzawi
Air Attache

Revised Programme for Tuesday, 29th April.

The party will split into two teams;

Army

Major General Shenshal
Major Faiq Ramadhan
Colonel Hilmy
accompanied by Colonel Berger

- 11.00 Depart Savoy Hotel for Fighting Vehicles Research & Development Establishment, Chobham, Surrey, for presentation on Ferret.
14.45 Depart FVRDE for EMI Hayes for presentation on Green Archer.
17.30 Depart EMI Hayes for Savoy Hotel.

Air

Lt Colonel Tikriti *
Lt Colonel Qaisi
Captain Rashid
Captain Sahib
Colonel Azzawi *

accompanied by Wing Commander Harrison, and EIR representative. *

- 10.30¹⁵ Depart Savoy Hotel for Ministry of Defence, Metropole Building, Room 06, for discussions on Training for IAF personnel.
12.00 Depart Metropole Building for Savoy Hotel.
13.50 Depart Savoy Hotel for Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd, STC House, 190, Strand, W.C.2, for presentations on communications and airfield equipment.

Evening as guests of ST&C.

Revised Programme for Wednesday 30th April.

- 10.15 Depart Savoy Hotel for Ministry of Technology, Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, W.1 for presentation of guided weapons.
12.30 Depart Stuart House for Kettners for lunch, host Mr J. Christie.
14.15 Return to Stuart House for final meeting.

Revised timetable for Thursday May 1st.

- 11.00 Depart Savoy Hotel for London (Heathrow) Airport, Alcock and Brown Suite, Building No. 3, for flight BA758 to Baghdad.

For training discussions Tuesday 29th, room allocated *

D. 21

29 APR 1969

| D121 (A13) | | |
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| Appt | Seen | Date |
| W. C. 2 | 11.00 | 29.4.69 |

N.E.D. (through Mr. Burke)

You should see the Iraqi request below for various training courses.

2. The principal difficulties will be I think with the requirement for Basic Flying Training. As I recall N.E.D. had stipulated that any approval by FCO to this sort of training was to be linked to Iraq's purchasing British ~~than~~ hardware. Is this hardware to be continued?

Regg. This
Previous notes
Please
AMM

515.

Not Rington
12/5

Mr Rington

D.S.B. is writing on this.
I will ~~answer~~ draft ~~to~~ this
bans. 12/5

I think that the remains to be put in order to Basic Flying Training is concerned. You will have seen from Baghdad telegrams 456, 457, 458 of last week - that there is a possibility of Iraqi interest in purchasing British aircraft engines, in the reasonably near future. You may wish to wait until we know where we are on this issue before discussing matters connected to a too definite reply to the request.

ms 12
copy of these
please
12/5

AMM H. 12/5/69


DS. Form 4

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 456

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 MAY 1969

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ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 456 OF 14 MAY R F I MINTECH (FOR
BENJEMIN EIR(2)) AND CRED/B O T(FOR SINCLAIR .)

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

HOBDAV OF B A C HAD A MEETING LASTING OVER AN HOUR WITH GENERAL
HARDAN TIKRITI ON 12 MAY. TIKRITI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) IRAQ WANTS TO PURCHASE LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM. HER REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE AIRCRAFT, RADAR AND
EQUIPMENT OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING SAM MISSILES AND PATROL BOATS
FOR THE NAVY-

(B) IRAQ SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO BUY:(TABULATE FOLLOWING
UNDER TWO HEADINGS QUOTE ITEM UNQUOTE AND QUOTE APPROXIMATE VALUE
UNQUOTE)

(1) TWO SQUADRONS OF LIGHTNINGS WITH SPARES ETC.....£52M.

(2) TWO SQUADRONS OF JAGUAR WITH SPARES ETC...£47M.

(3) TWO SQUADRONS OF BAC 167 WITH SPARES ETC.....£8M.

TOTAL £107 MILLION.

IN ADDITION THEY WANT RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FROM
MARCONI AND POSSIBLY RAPIER. THIS (GP UNDEC ? MIGHT)AMOUNT TO A
FURTHER £20M.

(C) IRAQ WOULD LIKE THE U K TO PROVIDE LARGE SCALE
TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT-

(D) IRAQ WISHES TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE WEST AND REQUIRES
WESTERN SUPPORT. HER TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH BRITAIN COULD
FLOWER AGAIN IF H M G WOULD HELP IN SORTING OUT IRAQ'S PROBLEMS
WITH THE I P C AND OTHERWISE SHOW A
SERIOUS INTENTION TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. IRAQ IS NOT A COMMUNIST
COUNTRY AND THE IRAQIS DO NOT FAVOUR COMMUNISM-

/(E) HE

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- 2 -

(E) HE NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF H M G IN RESOLVING POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. IF HE COULD BE SURE OF RETURNING FROM A VISIT TO LONDON WITH QUOTE SOMETHING IN HIS HAND UNQUOTE HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ORDER MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT IRAQ REQUIRED-

(F) THE DANGER OF H M G'S PRESENT COOL ATTITUDE IS THAT IRAQ MAY BE COMPELLED AGAIN TO BUY FROM RUSSIA ON ACCOUNT OF CHEAP PRICES AND PRESSURES FROM WITHIN THE BA'ATH PARTY. IRAQ HAS BEEN PROMISED MIG23S ON FAVOURABLE TERMS AS THE PRICE OF RECOGNITION OF THE G D R. IRAQ HOWEVER, SHOULD BE LESS DEPENDENT ON THE U S S R FOR ARMS PARTICULARLY AS THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PLEASED WITH PAST SUPPORT-

(G) HE AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN INVITED TO MOSCOW AT THE END OF (GP UNDEC) TO EVALUATE THE MIG23. IF THIS MATCHES UP TO IRAQ'S REQUIREMENTS IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TO REFUSE IT, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE BRITISH EQUIPMENT. A MIG 23 PURCHASE WOULD PUT PAID TO ANY PROSPECT OF ANY LIGHTNING OR JAGUAR SALE.

(H) HE HOPES THAT B A C WILL DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO ASSIST A STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND H M G. ANY SIGNS ON OFFICIAL INTEREST WILL BE WELCOME. (HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH REINSTATING THE COMET MISSION URGENTLY).

2. HOBDAV IS GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THE POSSIBILITIES OF VERY LARGE SCALE ORDERS HERE AND CONSIDERS THAT, GIVEN THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, THERE COULD BE CONTRACTS FOR B A C AND OTHER BRITISH FIRMS ON THE SAME SCALE AS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND LIBYA.

3. MINTECH PLEASE PASS TO H.R. BAXENDALE
B A C PRESTON DIVISION.

4. PLEASE SEE MY TWO I F T.

F C O PASS CRED/BOT AND MINTECH.

MR. HAWLEY

[PASSED TO MINTECH AND
BOARD OF TRADE]

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CYPHER CAT/A
PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NO 457

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
14 MAY 1969

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 457 OF 14 MAY & F I MINTECH (FOR BENJAMIN EIR2.) AND CRW/BOT (FOR SINCLAIR.)

M I P T : ARMS FOR IRAQ.

TAKRITI SENT HUSSOUN, AN INTERMEDIARY HE HAS PREVIOUSLY USED, TO SEE HOBDAV AGAIN ON 13 MAY TO REINFORCE THE POINTS MADE AT THE MEETING ON 12 MAY. THE NEED FOR AN I P C SETTLEMENT WAS AGAIN STRESSED BUT NOTHING NEW WAS BROUGHT UP EXCEPT THAT

(A) IF THE MIG 23 DEAL IS TO BE FOILED, SWIFT ACTION IS REQUIRED, AND

(B) TAKRITI MAY NOT BE GOING TO MOSCOW QUITE SO EARLY AS HE TOLD HOBDAV.

F C O PASS MINTECH AND CRED/BOT.

MR. HAWLEY / PASSED TO MINTECH & B.O.T. /

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(63)

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 458

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
16 MAY 1969

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| COPYED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 MAY 1969 AND NEQ 10/2 |
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ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 458 OF 15 MAY R F I MINTECH AND
CRE/BOT AND SAVING TO TEHRAN CAIRO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MY TWO I P T : ARMS SALES FOR IRAQ. (NOT TO ALL.)

HARDAN TAKRITI TOOK THE SAME LINE WITH HOBDAV AS HE
DID WITH H M AMBASSADOR ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS LAST YEAR. IT IS
SIGNIFICANT AND ENCOURAGING THAT HE MAINTAINS IT AFTER THE EVENTS
OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS - THE MORE SO IN VIEW OF HIS PROVEN
RECORD OF TURNING TO THE U K FOR EQUIPMENT IN 1963.

2. TAKRITI AND THOSE FAVOURING A POLICY OF QUOTE OPENING
TO THE WEST UNQUOTE APPEAR AT PRESENT STRONGER THAN THEY WERE.
THIS MAY BE DUE TO A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITHIN THE PRESENT
REGIME THAT THE BALANCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN DEPENDENCE IN
THE EAST AND THE WEST AND THAT THE QUOTE RIGHTISTS UNQUOTE SHOULD
BE GIVEN THEIR HEAD TO COMPENSATE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE
GDR AND OTHER MEASURES FAVOURING THE BLOC. ALTERNATIVELY,
TAKRITI AND THOSE WHO THINK LIKE HIM HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY WORRIED
BY RECENT BLOC ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR, THE SULPHUR DEAL WITH
POLAND AND INCREASED RUSSIAN ACTIVITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
IRAQI/SOVIET ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT, IN
ADDITION TO RECOGNITION OF GDR.

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3. TAKRITI APPEARS IMMEDIATELY TO BE LOOKING FOR:-

(A) SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL FRIENDLY GESTURE BY H M G TOWARDS THE PRESENT REGIME, AND HE THINKS, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THAT SUCH A GESTURE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION-

(B) THAT SETTLEMENT WITH I P C - PREFERABLY ONE FOR WHICH HE COULD TAKE SOME CREDIT - TO ENABLE IRAQ TO PLACE THE MILITARY ORDERS WITH THE U K WHICH THE QUOTE RIGHTISTS UNQUOTE FAVOUR-

(C) EARLY DELIVERY OF U K EQUIPMENT BOTH TO DEMONSTRATE ITS QUALITY AND SHOW THAT H M G IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY ARMS IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES TO IRAQ. ((B) AND (C) ARE CLOSELY LINKED.)

4. I APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES IN BEING VERY FORTHCOMING WITH THE IRAQIS AT PRESENT, DESPITE THE INCREASING NUMBER OF FRIENDLY OVERTURES WHICH ARE BEING MADE TO US HERE. HOWEVER, THE PROSPECT WHICH TAKRITI OFFERS IS CERTAINLY GLITTERING AND THE PRIZES IMMENSE IF WE CAN REALLY WIN THEM. MOREOVER, IF TAKRITI'S HAND COULD BE STRENGTHENED, IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST. MANY MODERATE IRAQIS WOULD NOW LIKE TO SEE HIM DOMINATE THE GOVERNMENT AND THINK THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE COUNTRY WOULD IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY IF HE WERE TO DO SO. SOME SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND A RELAXATION OF TENSION WITH IRAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED AND WE COULD LOOK FORWARD TO AN INCREASED SHARE OF CIVIL AS WELL AS DEFENCE CONTRACTS - ALWAYS ASSUMING NO FRESH UPSET IN ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

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BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 458 TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

○. TAKRITI'S FRESH APPROACH SHOULD, I CONSIDER, BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BECAUSE

(A) HE HAS BEEN ABSOLUTELY CONSISTENT IN PROPOUNDING HIS VIEWS ON HOW IRAQI'S RELATIONS WITH THE U K MIGHT DEVELOP-

(B) IT CONFIRMS SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (BAGHDAD TELNOS. 393 AND 415) THAT AN I P C SETTLEMENT WOULD IMPROVE IRAQI RELATIONS WITH THE U K-

(C) IT SUGGESTS THAT HE NOW HAS BOTH THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO HELP OVER A SETTLEMENT WITH IPC.

6. NEVERTHELESS, I REMAIN SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL WHETHER TAKRITI WOULD IN THE EVENT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE WHAT HE HOPES FOR.

(A) DOES NOT YET DOMINATE THE PARTY, THOUGH HIS RELATIVE STRENGTH SEEMS RECENTLY TO HAVE INCREASED, AND THE GOVERNMENT- AMMASH AND THE QUOTE LEFTIST UNQUOTE ARE STILL IN OFFICE.

(B) MIGHT HAVE TO GIVE INTO PRESSURE TO BUY RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT IN VIEW OF THE FAVOURABLE TERMS THEY OFFER (THE MIG 23 IS SAID TO BE HALF THE PRICE OF THE LIGHTING) EVEN THOUGH HE AND TECHNICAL MEMBERS ON HIS STAFF HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST TO DAMN IT ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS WHEN THEY VISIT RUSSIA.

/(c)

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- 4 -

(C) MIGHT FIND THAT HE HAD LESS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE THAN HE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF THE MERCURIAL STATE OF ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

7. HOWEVER, DESPITE A DEGREE OF FACTUAL SCEPTICISM, IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A LARGE SCALE ORDER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY THE IRAQIS, ASSUMING THAT THE NECESSARY LICENCES WILL BE GRANTED. WE ARE PLAYING FOR HIGH STAKES BOTH IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY CONTRACTS AND ENHANCED TRADING OPPURTUNITIES. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION :-

(A) EXPLORING WHETHER MR. FOWLER, WHO IS REPORTED TO BE VISITING SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT IN MID-JUNE COULD COME TO BAGHDAD TO MEET THE MINISTER, (ASSUMING HE WILL BE HERE) . AND OTHER IMPORTANT CONTACTS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. THIS WOULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR A VISIT BY MR. ROBERTS IN RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUT COULD BE A USEFUL QUOTE ICE BREAKER UNQUOTE.

(B) RE-INSTATEMENT OF THE COMET MISSION AND FIXING DEFINITE DATE FOR THE VISIT. (WE ARE ALREADY IN CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THIS.) THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME TIME BEFORE, SAY, 30 [SIC] JUNE, OR LATER IN THE YEAR AFTER THE HOT WEATHER IS OVER.

(C) TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TAKRITI'S PROPOSED VISIT TO THE U K FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT (H M AMBASSADOR'S LETTER TO TRIPP 3/4 OF 3 MAY, NOT COPIED TO POSTS) TO ARRANGE SUITABLE MEETINGS WITH MINISTERS, IPC AND INTERESTED FIRMS.

(D)

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BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 458 TO F.C.O.

- 5 -

(D) H M AMBASSADOR SEEKING AN EARLY INTERVIEW WITH TAKRITI FOR ANOTHER TOUR D'HORIZON.

8. PLEASE INFORM IPC OF HOBDAV'S CONVERSATION WITH TAKRITI. HOBDAV HAS NO OBJECTION.

9. H M AMBASSADOR MAY WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER ON HIS RETURN.

F C O PASS MINTECH AND BOT AND SAVING TO TEHRAN CAIRO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

MR. HAWLEY

[SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINTECH
AND BOARD OF TRADE]

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PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 420

TO BAGHDAD
16 MAY 1969.

(NED) NEQ 10/2

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. ⁽⁶¹⁾456 AND ⁽⁶²⁾457: ARMS SALES FOR IRAQ.

GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF TAKRITI'S INTENTIONS AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS CONVERSATION. IS HE SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF OR ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE, AND HOW IS THIS CONNECTED WITH SHENSHAL'S RECENT VISIT?

2. WE ARE PUZZLED AT TAKRITI'S COMMENT ON 'H.M.G.'S PRESENT COOL ATTITUDE', AND THE REFERENCE TO RETURNING FROM A TRIP TO LONDON WITH SOMETHING IN HIS HAND. CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO ORGANISE AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAMME FOR SHENSHAL'S DELEGATION. IS TAKRITI NOW DISCOUNTING OR IGNORING THE VISIT OF HIS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, WHO INTER ALIA SAW PRESENTATIONS BY BAG OF THE LIGHTNING AND THE BAG 167? (IN THIS CONNEXION SEE PARAS 6 TO 8 OF ACLAND'S LETTER TO MCKEARNEY IN THE NEXT BAG.)

3. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES OVER SUPPLY OF SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT LISTED (JAGUAR AND RAPIER ON SECURITY GROUNDS AMONG OTHERS) AND OVER GIVING COMMITMENTS IN ADVANCE OF A FIRM ORDER EVEN FOR THOSE ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE EASIER. TO WHAT EXTENT DO TAKRITI'S REMARKS IMPLY AN ORDER, AND ARE THE IRAQIS NOW PREPARED TO TAKE THINGS FURTHER WITH THE FIRMS CONCERNED?

STEWART

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* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
Unclassified

Flash
Immediate
~~Priority~~
~~Normal~~

(Date).....

Despatched
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PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

BAGHDAD

telegram No.....

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Nos.

Your telegrams 456 and 457 of 14 and 15 May:
Arms Sales for Iraq.

Grateful for your considered assessment of the
seriousness of Takriti's intentions and of the
implications of this conversation. Is he speaking
for himself or on behalf of the government as a whole,
and how is this connected with Shenshal's recent
visit?

2. We are puzzled at Takriti's comment on "H.M.G.'s
present cool attitude", and the reference to
returning from a trip to London with something in
his hand. Considerable efforts were made to
organise an appropriate programme for Shenshal's
delegation. Is Takriti now discounting or ignoring
the visit of his Deputy Chief of Staff, who inter
alia saw presentations by BAC of the Lightning and the
BAC 167? (In this connection see paras. 6 to 8 of
Acland's letter to McKearney in the next bag.)

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 420

(Date) 16/5

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3. You are aware of the ^{great} difficulties over ~~arms~~ ^{supply of some of the equipment listed (Jaguar & Rapier} ~~supplies of the type requested~~ and over giving ^{even for those which might be easier} commitments in advance of a firm order. To what extent do Takriti's remarks imply an order, and are the Iraqis now prepared to take things further with the firms concerned?

on security grounds among others)

~~AM~~ 16
5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 474

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
20 MAY 1969.

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 474 OF 20 MAY RFI TO MINTECH BOARD OF TRADE
AND SAVING TO CAIRO TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW KUWAIT AND JEDDA.
YOUR TELNO 420 (NOT REPEATED) ;
ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

63
YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN HAWLEY'S TELEGRAM NO. 458 WITH WHICH
I AM IN AGREEMENT. IN PARTICULAR I AGREE THAT TIKRITI'S INTENTIONS
ARE SERIOUS - HE HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THIS LINE. I DOUBT HOWEVER
WHETHER HE IS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE MUCH LESS
THE PARTY, BUT HIS VIEW ALMOST CERTAINLY REPRESENTS THAT OF A
NUMBER OF IMPORTANT FIGURES IN IT INCLUDING PROBABLY THE PRESIDENT'S.

2. SHENSHAL'S VISIT SHOULD, I THINK, BE INTERPRETED AS AN
INDICATION OF TIKRITI'S ACTIVE DESIRE TO ACQUIRE BRITISH EQUIPMENT
WHICH HE HAS ALL ALONG WISHED TO DO. IRAQIS WERE DISTINCTLY PLEASED
WITH WAY VISIT WENT. BUT KEY TO SITUATION REMAINS SAME AS IT WAS
LAST YEAR, NAMELY A SETTLEMENT OF IPC DISPUTE (MY TELNO 230 OF 1
SEPTEMBER 1968). WITHOUT THIS CHANCES OF REALLY LARGE SCALE
PURCHASES ARE PROBABLY NOT GREAT, EVEN IF ATTRACTIVE CREDIT TERMS
WERE OFFERED.

3. SINCE CONCLUSION OF CONSORTIUM'S LATEST DEAL WITH IRANIANS
(YOUR TELNO 332 TO TEHRAN) IRAQIS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS MORE
STRONGLY FOR AN IPC SETTLEMENT ON GENEROUS TERMS. FAILING SUCH A
SETTLEMENT DANGER OF THEM DOING SOMETHING RASH WILL BE GREATER.
MINISTER OF OIL HAS ALREADY GIVEN INDICATIONS OF THIS AND THERE
ARE WARNINGS IN PRESS (MY TELNO 472).

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4. IN SPEAKING OF HMG'S QUOTE PRESENT COOL ATTITUDE UNQUOTE TIKRITI WAS NO DOUBT REFERRING MORE TO GENERAL COLDNESS, AND INDEED HOSTILITY, TOWARDS IRAQ SHOWN BY BRITISH PRESS AND INFORMATION MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS THAN TO HMG'S ATTITUDE AS SUCH.

5. TIKRITI HAS SEVERAL TIMES STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO LONDON, BUT HAS ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COME AWAY EMPTY HANDED, I.E. HE WANTS TO PLACE ORDERS FOR BRITISH EQUIPMENT AS HE DID IN 1963. HE HAS REFERRED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO NEED TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW, IN TERMS OF AN IPC SETTLEMENT AND OF DELIVERIES OF HARDWARE, FOR CLOSER CONTACTS WITH U.K. (SEE FOR EXAMPLE PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 348 OF 22 OCTOBER, 1968).

6. TIKRITI IS CERTAINLY NOT DISCOUNTING OR IGNORING VISIT PAID BY SHENSHAL. ON CONTRARY HE SEEMS TO WANT SOMETHING CONCRETE TO COME OUT OF IT, BUT IPC SETTLEMENT REMAINS CRUCIAL. TIKRITI'S REMARKS DO NOT IMPLY AN ORDER BUT DO SHOW A CLEAR INTENTION TO PURCHASE IF RIGHT CONDITIONS CAN BE CREATED.

FCO PASS TO MINTECH CRED A B OF T AND SAVING TO CAIRO TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

MR EVANS.

/ REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO SAVING POSTS /
/ PASSED TO MINTECH AND B.O.T. /

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Mr. Arthur

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| 22 MAY 1969 |
| NEQ 10/2 |

Arms Sales for Iraq 6,62,63

65 Baghdad telegrams Nos. 456, 457, 458 and 474 are attached. Our telegram No. 420 to which Baghdad telegram No. 474 was an answer is also attached.

Flags ABCDFlag E

2. H.M. Ambassador and Mr. Hawley are convinced that General Takriti is serious in his intention to buy arms from the United Kingdom. It is certainly true that he has been consistent in expressing this wish. However, it is reasonable to assume that before a major order for British weapons could be placed Takriti would have to be in a position to carry the Iraqi Government with him. Both H.M. Ambassador and Mr. Hawley agree that General Takriti is not at present in such a position but (as implied by paragraph 3 of Baghdad telegram No. 458) if he was instrumental in helping to settle the dispute with I.P.C. (in terms favourable to the Iraqis) then it is arguable that his position within the government would be strengthened to the extent that he might be able to authorise the purchase of a significant amount of military equipment from this country.

3. General Takriti's primary concern, understandably enough, probably is to strengthen his personal position with the party leadership. Contrary to Mr. Hawley's view (paragraph 6(a) of Baghdad telegram No. 458) Takriti's relative strength seems recently to have decreased, and we have no evidence to show that "Takriti and those favouring a policy of opening to the West appear at present stronger than they were" (paragraph 2). Indeed it is the left-wing, (friendly to the Soviet bloc) doctrinal Ba'athists headed by the Minister of the Interior, Mehdi Ammash, who have been in the ascendant in recent months. Mr. Hawley mentions the recognition of the GDR, the Poland sulphur deal, increased Russian technical cooperation. He could also have referred to a cultural agreement with Hungary which has just been signed, and to a recent agricultural aid agreement with Bulgaria. We have had recent reports of the supply to Iraq of Russian MIG 21s and other military equipment. Takriti himself, who may well be embarrassed by the "pro-western" tag often applied to him, is reported as intending to go to the U.S.S.R. himself - possibly to conclude a new arms deal. At the same time, he may be trying to show that he as good a Socialist and as anti-Imperialist as the other top figures within the party leadership. The Iraqi official attitude to the west as displayed by the state controlled information media is hostile - U.S.A. and West Germany are damned as friends of Israel; we also are tarred with this brush (Iraqi reaction to the rumours about the tank deal

/with

with Israel was strident and aggressive) and over the Shatt al Arab issue we have been linked with Iran as part of an Imperialist/Cento plot to divert Iraqi troops from the Israeli front. There may indeed be people in the Ba'ath party who would favour closer western ties to counterbalance the growing influence of the Soviet bloc but there is little to indicate that they are in a position to influence events in Iraq at the present time.

Flag F

Flag G

Flag H

Flag I

(Baghdad tel.
No. 472)

4. As H.M. Ambassador has pointed out the settlement of the I.P.C. dispute is a crucial factor in any Iraqi arms deal with this country. Takriti has asked us to use our influence with the I.P.C. before (Baghdad telegram No. 230 of 2 September 1968). Our policy on this remains as stated by Mr. Roberts to the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Planning on 18 December 1968 "H.M.G. would like to see a solution but could not intervene". We have told H.M. Ambassador in a basic policy document (NEQ 3/1 of 12 November 1968) that we might in fact be prepared to intervene at the request of the Company, but there is no reason to think that the I.P.C. would welcome any initiative from us at the moment. The situation has not significantly changed in spite of minor overtures to the I.P.C. by the Iraqis and judging from Iraqi press reports that the Iran/Consortium agreement is yet another imperialist conspiracy against Iraq, it seems unlikely that there will be much progress in the immediate future. It therefore follows, unless there is to be a change in our basic policy towards the I.P.C./Iraq dispute, that we should not contemplate an arms deal with Iraq which is dependent on our using our influence (to the detriment of the I.P.C. position and in favour of Iraq) to dictate a settlement of this dispute. The two matters should not be linked.

5. However, having said this, we still recognise that Takriti is an important figure in Iraq and whatever his motives may be, could one day be in a position to influence the Iraqi Government into doing business with us, always assuming that it is understood that any orders for hardware are not linked with a settlement of the I.P.C. dispute and are for weapons, the supply of which is not ruled out under the terms of our Middle East arms policy (as laid down in the OPD paper of November 1967) and taking into consideration recent developments in the area). We have nothing to lose in being friendly towards him. He already is aware that we are prepared to sell Iraq 'Tigercat' and we could perhaps remind him of this as a "friendly gesture towards the present regime", which he claims he wants. We should therefore sympathetically consider the various courses of action as suggested by our Embassy in paragraph 7 of telegram No. 458:-

- (a) Mr. Fowler's proposed visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is in some doubt in view of a Cabinet decision that Ministers should not go abroad during the post Whitsun session of Parliament.

/General

-3-

General Takriti may well be in this country himself in mid-June so it might be better to await confirmation of the timings of these two visits before considering a definite course of action on this point.

- (b) The COMET Mission was due to go to Baghdad in late January. It was postponed, at 24 hours' notice, at the request of the Iraqi Government (it coincided with the first batch of Iraqi executions which were strongly criticised in the House of Commons and in the British press). Owing to difficulties in getting together the members of the original mission, COMET has said that it would find it difficult to send out a delegation before the autumn. Mid-October has been suggested to our Commercial Counsellor in Baghdad who will presumably discuss this with the Iraqis.
- (c) We await firm dates for Takriti's own visit and some indication of his wishes as far as a programme is concerned. It would not be appropriate, nor probably welcome to Takriti himself, to suggest that this should be in any sense an official visit.
- (d) We have no objection to H.M. Ambassador seeking an interview with Takriti. He could remind the Minister of Defence of our willingness to sell Tigercat (the Iraqis may be losing interest in the missile) and also take the opportunity of reiterating our policy towards the I.P.C./Iraq dispute. It would be helpful if Takriti on his part could throw some light on his forthcoming visit to this country (~~which we strongly welcome~~) so that we can make suitable arrangements for his reception and consider what Ministers (if any) he should see.

Flag J

--- 6. I attach a draft telegram for your approval.

A.A. Acland

(A.A. Acland)

21 May, 1969.


M. Hinchcliffe
pa.

Tel. despatched
21/5

24/5

Copy

Mr. Acland
Mr. MacRae

Arms for Iraq

I am engaged, as you know in drafting a Blue Minute and a draft telegram in reply to the three telegrams from Baghdad.

2. You will have seen references to Takriti's "fears" that he may be pressured into buying MIG 23s. I understand from the assessment staff, and this is confirmed by DIA, that MIG 23s are only in experimental use with the Russians - not even in service with their own forces and that they (the Russians) have no intention of supplying them to anyone (including Warsaw Pact countries) for a number of years. It is unlikely that Iraq would be given special consideration in this case.

3. Almost certainly Takriti is (probably in all innocence as other Arabs have recently made the same error) referring to an up-dated version of the MIG 21 which has basically the same performance as the old 21 but with more sophisticated electronic equipment including more efficient radar.

4. I understand that the Lightning is a better aircraft for Iraqi purposes (defence against Israeli fighters?) than the updated MIG 21 but it is true that the Russians could offer the MIG at a much lower cost than we could afford to sell the Lightning.

(P.R.N. Hinchcliffe)

20 May 1969

c.c. NEQ 10/2 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 432

TO BAGHDAD

21 MAY 1969. (NE)

67

TOP COPY

NEQ 10/2

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELNO 432 OF 21 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
SAVING TO CAIRO TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KUWAIT, JEDDA.

YOUR TELNOS ^{61,62}456, 457 OF 14 MAY (NOT TO ALL) ⁶³458 OF 16 MAY AND 474
OF 20 MAY.

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF TAKRITI'S INTENTIONS AND
OF HIS POSITION WITHIN THE REGIME.

2. ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD WELCOME A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
I P C AND IRAQ, WE ARE NOT DISPOSED TO TRY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE
I P C IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS WAS CLEARLY STATED BY MR
ROBERTS TO THE IRAQI MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY AND PLANNING ON 18
DECEMBER 1968 (PAGE 2 OF THE RECORD OF CONVERSATION REFERS). WE
WOULD CONSIDER INVOLVEMENT IF ASKED BY THE COMPANY, BUT THERE IS NO
SIGN THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME (OR ACCEPT) ANY INTERVENTION BY US
AT THIS STAGE. THUS ANY ARMS DEAL WITH IRAQ WHICH IS LINKED TO A
SETTLEMENT WITH THE I P C (BY DEFINITION DICTATED BY H M G TO THE
DETRIMENT OF THE I P C POSITION AND IN FAVOUR OF IRAQ) CLEARLY IS A
NON-STARTER.

3. WE OF COURSE RECOGNISE THAT TAKRITI (HOWEVER WEAK OR STRONG HIS
POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY MAY BE AT THIS MOMENT) IS AN IMPORTANT
FIGURE AND WELL WORTH CULTIVATING. AS LONG AS IT IS CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD THAT ORDERS FOR HARDWARE ARE NOT LINKED WITH A
SETTLEMENT OF THE I P C DISPUTE AND ARE NOT RULED OUT UNDER THE TERMS
OF OUR MIDDLE EAST ARMS POLICY, THEN WE ARE OPEN FOR BUSINESS AND
WILL TREAT HIS FRIENDLY APPROACHES AT THEIR FACE VALUE. HE MIGHT BE
REMINDED THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY TIGERCAT TO IRAQ COULD BE
INTERPRETED AS A QUOTE FRIENDLY GESTURE BY H M G TOWARDS THE PRESENT
REGIME UNQUOTE - SOMETHING HE CLAIMS TO WANT.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED HAWLEY'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF HIS TELEGRAM 458. OUR COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) MR FOWLER'S PROPOSED VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT IS NOW IN SOME DOUBT. AS TAKRITI MAY WELL BE IN THIS COUNTRY AT THAT TIME ANYHOW, WE CANNOT CONSIDER A POSSIBLE VISIT TO IRAQ UNTIL MORE DEFINITE TIMINGS ARE KNOWN BOTH FOR TAKRITI AND FOR MR FOWLER.

(B) WE UNDERSTAND THAT COMET HAVE PROPOSED A VISIT IN MID-OCTOBER AND THAT HAWLEY IS IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH THOMPSON ON THIS. AN EARLIER VISIT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, AS THE MEMBERS OF THE ORIGINAL TEAM ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL THE AUTUMN. NO DOUBT YOU WILL BE INFORMING THE IRAQIS THAT COMET WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME OUT.

(C) WE AWAIT FIRM DATES FOR TAKRITI'S OWN VISIT AND SOME INDICATION OF HIS WISHES AS FAR AS A PROGRAMME IS CONCERNED. WE DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE (NOR PROBABLY WELCOME TO TAKRITI) TO SUGGEST THAT HIS VISIT SHOULD BE IN ANY SENSE AN OFFICIAL ONE. WHEN WE KNOW WHAT HE INTENDS TO DO WE WILL MAKE SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS RECEPTION AND CONSIDER - SUBJECT TO YOUR ADVICE- WHAT MINISTERS (IF ANY) HE SHOULD SEE.

(D) WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH TAKRITI. YOU MIGHT LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MENTIONING OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY TIGERCAT AND OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ORDERS FOR OTHER WEAPONS, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY SOME OF THE ITEMS LISTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM 456 AND REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF OUR TELEGRAM 420. THE BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING IS TO BUILD ON GENERAL SHENSHAL'S VISIT, AND AS APPROPRIATE TO EMBARK ON MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FIRMS CONCERNED. WHEN A FIRM ORDER IS PLACED, OR WHEN THE STAGE IS REACHED THAT GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL IS REQUIRED, WE CAN SEEK MINISTERIAL AUTHORITY FOR THE DEAL.

STEWART

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N.E.D.

DEF. POL. D.

D.T.S.D.

OIL. D.

MOD INTERNAL

TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S
Communications Department

N. E. D.

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

0. 432. to Baghdad. — 21-5-69.

TO:

M. C. B. Benjamin, M/Kech. Stuart Hse.

M. L. A. C. News. B.O.T. Hieegac Hse.

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department:

(Initials) ... 

(Date) .. 22-5-69

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE REGISTRY FOR RETENTION

Registry No. **NE**
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

| SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | PRIORITY MARKINGS |
|---|---|
| Top Secret Secret <u>Confidential</u> Restricted Unclassified | Flash Immediate } Priority Routine |

(Date)

Despatched

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.
Code
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

BAGHDAD

Addressed to

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

27 MAY 1969

NEQ 10/2

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 432

(Date) 21/5

And to:—

Saving to CAIRO, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KUWAIT, JEDDA

Repeat to:—
Flag A =
Flag B =
Flag C =
Flag D =

Nos.
Your telegrams 456, 457 [of 14 May] (not to all)
458 [of 16 May] and 474 [of 20 May].

Arms for Iraq Anglo-Iraqi relations.

We are grateful for your assessment of Takriti's intentions and of his position within the regime.

Although we should welcome a settlement of the dispute between IPC and Iraq, we are not disposed to try to put pressure on the IPC in this matter. Our policy towards the IPC/Iraq dispute is one of non-intervention. This was

clearly stated by Mr. ~~Goremy~~ Roberts to the Iraqi Ministers of Industry and Planning on 18 December 1968 (page 2 of the record of conversation refers).

We ~~must~~ ^{would} consider ^{involvement} ~~intervening~~ if asked to do so by the company, but there is no sign that they would ^(or accept) ~~welcome~~ ^{intervention by us} any ~~such initiative from us~~ at this stage.

Thus any arms deal with Iraq which is linked to a settlement with the IPC (by definition dictated by HMG to the detriment of the IPC position and in

/favour.....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Saving to:—

Cairo, Tehran, Washington, Moscow, Kuwait, Jeddah

in present circumstances.

Distribution:—

Departmental
N.E.D.,
D.P.D.,
D.T.S.D.,
Oil Dept.

Copies to:—

MOD Internal
Min. Tech. ~~Staff~~ ^{Hse.}
(Mr. Benjamin) ^{CB}
BOT (Mr. News)
^{Hse.}
^{Hse.}

17552
21/5/69

favour of Iraq) clearly is a non-starter.

3. We of course recognise that Takriti (however weak or strong his position within the party may be at this moment) is an important figure and well worth cultivating. As long as it is clearly understood that orders for hardware are not linked with a settlement of the IPC dispute and are not ruled out under the terms of our Middle East arms policy, then we are open for business and ^{will} treat his friendly approaches at their face value. He might be reminded that our willingness to supply Tigercat to Iraq could be interpreted as a "friendly gesture by HMG towards the present regime" - something he claims to want.

4. We have ^{carefully considered} ~~given sympathetic consideration to~~ Hawley's recommendations in paragraph 7 of ^{his} ~~your~~ telegram 458. Our comments are as follows:

Flag C

(a) Mr. Fowler's proposed visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is ^{now} ~~in~~ some doubt. ~~for UK domestic reasons.~~ As Takriti may well be in this country at that time anyhow, we ^{cannot consider} ~~should~~ ^{a possible visit to Iraq} ~~suspend action~~ until more definite timings are known ^{TAKRITI AND MR.} ~~both for Takriti and for Mr Fowler.~~

(b) We understand that COMET have proposed a visit in mid-October and that Hawley is in correspondence with Thompson on this. An earlier visit would be difficult, as the members of the original team are not available until the autumn. No doubt you will be informing the Iraqis that COMET would ^{be prepared} ~~like~~ to come out.

(c) We await firm dates for Takriti's own visit ~~which we welcome~~ and some indication of his /wishes.....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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wishes as far as a programme is concerned. We ~~don't~~^{do not} think it would be appropriate (nor probably welcome to Takriti) to suggest that his visit should be in any sense an official one. When we know what he intends to do we will make suitable arrangements for his reception and consider - subject to your advice - what Ministers (if any) he should see.

(d) We have no objection to your seeking an interview with Takriti. You might like to take the opportunity of mentioning our willingness to supply Tigercat and our readiness to consider orders for other weapons, taking into consideration the possible difficulties raised by some of the items listed in your telegram 456 and referred to in paragraph 3 of our telegram 420. ~~You might also re-state our policy on the IPC/Iraq dispute.~~

Flag A
Flag E

The best way of proceeding is to build on General Shenshal's visit, and as appropriate to embark on more detailed discussions with the firms concerned. When a firm order is placed, or when the stage is reached that governmental approval is required, we can seek ~~the~~ ministerial authority for the deal.

21
5.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

68
EN CLAIR

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 495

27 MAY 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

| |
|---|
| RECEIVED IN COPY REGISTRY No. 10 27 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/2 |
|---|

Addressed to F.C.O. telegram No. 495 of 27 May.

Repeated for information to Moscow, Washington and UKMIS New York.

General Hardan Abdul Shaffar Tikriti, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence left Baghdad on 26 May for Moscow. The press reports that he is leading an Iraqi military delegation on an official visit at the invitation of the Russian Minister of Defence.

MR EVANS

Pa PNMMA
28/5

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N. EASTERN DEPT.

AAAAA

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
FROM: Mr. D.C. Hole

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
930 7022 ext.

E.K. (69)

Our reference: D/DS 8a/5/2
reference:

22 May, 1969

IRAQ - RAF TRAINING

Earlier this month I sent you a copy of Col Al-Azzawi's letter of 26th April giving the Iraqi bids for RAF training on instructions from General Shanshall.

2. As you know, I explained to the Al Azzawi and Tikriti that the likelihood of Fighter Control courses in anything like a reasonable timescale was remote in the extreme and the position with Air Traffic Control courses was much the same.

3. As things stand at present, - though a sudden change is not unusual - we could take the 25 pilots for training probably starting next year: it is unlikely that any could be accepted this year, and, as you asked we were non-committal when we met the Iraqis. They wanted the training to start as early as possible and to go at least up to the end of basic flying i.e. wings standard. They would like this followed by advanced flying on the Hunter: this is likely to prove to be much more difficult from our point of view and we suggested in discussion that if Hunter flying could be done in Iraq it would suit us better.

4. We can offer only one PAI vacancy (from 25th August to 14th November, 1969) but the 4 QFI vacancies could be made available on a course from 29th September, 1969 to 2nd March, 1970. These would be preceded by Jet Provost acclimatisation and there would be no problem about fitting in the Instrument Rating Examiner courses for the same students.

5. As I mentioned to you just before we met the Iraqis there is no difficulty about meeting their request for the Engineer Officers course and you agreed we could make an offer on that. As QFI and PAI courses have been agreed recently I assume you will not object to the Iraqis having a few more? This leaves the pilot training requirement which, up to now, you have asked us not to take on. Is there any change on this from your point of view?

pa [signature]
16/6

[signature]
D. C. HOLE A.O.L.

N.O. Rampton, Esq.
Defence Training and Supply Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON, S.W.1.

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LAST PAPER CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT.A.

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO 509

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

30 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/2

Copy on NEQ 3/548/1

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 509 OF 29 MAY R F I SAVING TO
CAIRO KUWAIT JEDDA TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

(67)

YOUR TELNO. 432 : ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

1. ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS, LIKE ANGLO/ARAB RELATIONS, DEPEND PRIMARILY ON OUR ATTITUDE TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION. IN THE CASE OF ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS THERE IS, HOWEVER, THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE I P C DISPUTE.
2. MR HAHN HAS AGAIN RETURNED TO LONDON AFTER A SHORT VISIT TO BASRAH, IN ORDER TO FINALISE THE REVISION OF THE CARGO DUES AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THE COMPANY HOPE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE LIMITED NEGOTIATIONS WILL LEAD TO TALKS ON WIDER ISSUES.
3. AS REGARDS INVOLVEMENT OR INTERVENTION BY H M G, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE RIGHT NOT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CLEARLY SHOULD NOT TRY AND BRING PRESSURE ON THE COMPANY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHAT I THINK IS CALLED FOR IS ADVICE AND ENCOURAGEMENT. THE LOCAL MANAGEMENT HERE AND HEAD OFFICE IN LONDON, AT LEAST AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND EVEN SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUPS, WOULD, I BELIEVE, WELCOME IT.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

LAST PAPER

4. FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME THE MORE FAR-SIGHTED IN THE COMPANY HAVE REALISED THAT A FURTHER ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TRANSLATE THIS INTO ACTION. TIME MAY NOW BE GETTING SHORT. IF NO SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, THERE IS THE GROWING RISK OF THE GROUP LOSING THEIR VERY CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT THROUGH SOME RASH ACTION ON THE PART OF THE IRAQIS. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS IN NEIGHBOURING OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AGREEMENT, AND THE RESULTANT IMPROVEMENT IN GENERAL ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS, COULD SAFEGUARD THE INVESTMENT FOR A GOOD NUMBER OF YEARS AND WOULD NOT, I SUSPECT, NECESSARILY AT THIS STAGE IN THE GAME HAVE THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES ON THEIR CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SOME ELEMENTS IN THE COMPANY FEAR.

5. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN MADE MORE DELICATE AND URGENT BY THE LATEST AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALLUDED TO THIS IN CONVERSATION WITH MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR AND ME ON 27 MAY.

6. THE CRUX OF THE MATTER IS, OF COURSE, THE VIABILITY OF THE PRESENT IRAQI REGIME. IF IT IS DOOMED TO GO THE WAY OF ALL IRAQI GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1958, THE I P C ARE RIGHT TO ACCEPT THE RISKS OF SOLDIERING ON. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IF THEY DO THIS, THEY AND WE MAY BE DISILLUSIONED. THE BA'ATHIST REGIME IN SYRIA HAS LASTED, ADMITTEDLY WITH UPS AND DOWNS, SINCE 1963. THE REGIME IN IRAQ IS PROBABLY BETTER PLACED AND ITS CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN SOME FORM MAY BE GREATER. CLEARLY,

LAST PAPER

IT HAS ITS SHORT-COMINGS AND WEAKNESSES, BUT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AT LEAST, INCLUDES SOME FRIENDLY ELEMENTS, I E TAKRITI AND HIS FRIENDS.

7. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHOULD TAKE TAKRITI'S FRIENDLY ADVANCES SERIOUSLY. ORDERS FOR HARDWARE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE LINKED TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE I P C, BUT IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT AND, AS A RESULT, TAKRITI CAN DRAW ON ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES, THERE IS A GOOD PROSPECT OF MORE SUBSTANTIAL ARMS AND OTHER PURCHASES FROM THE U K AND ALSO OF PREVENTING IRAQ, AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE GULF, FROM FALLING INTO THE LAP OF THE RUSSIANS.

8. THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF EVIDENCE DURING THE PAST WEEKS OF THE RUSSIAN AND THEIR ALLIES GAINING GROUND. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, THE POLES HAVE SECURED CONTRACTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S SULPHUR DEPOSITS, AND THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES ARE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE. THE IRAQ/.U S S R FISHERIES AGREEMENT HAS BEEN RATIFIED AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCE IN THE GULF. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THERE IS THE IRAQI RECOGNITION OF THE G D R. INTERNALLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE REGIME IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED-PLEASE SEE MY TELNO. 487.

9. IT IS TO THE CREDIT OF THE REGIME THAT THEY ARE NOT ONLY INTERESTED IN ARMAMENTS, BUT ALSO IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY. LIKE THE SHAH, THEY BASE THEIR NEED

/FOR INCREASED

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

FOR INCREASED OIL REVENUES ON THE FACT THAT THEY ARE A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. FORTUNATELY, THE I P C TOP MANAGEMENT, IF NOT ALL IN THE CONSTITUENT GROUPS, ARE CONSCIOUS OF THIS - PLEASE SEE THE RECORD OF MY CONVERSATION WITH DALLEY TRANSMITTED WITH MY LETTER OF 15 FEBRUARY TO ELLINGWORTH.

10. I HOPE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY THE CONTINUING CONTACTS BETWEEN YOUR DEPARTMENT AND THE I P C AND THE GROUPS WILL BE TAKEN TO IMPRESS ON THOSE CONCERNED THE NEED FOR SOME FURTHER EFFORT, WHICH WOULD AT LEAST SHOW THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES THAT THE COMPANY ARE NOT STALLING.

F C O PASS SAVING TO CAIRO KUWAIT JEDDA TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Anglo/Iraqi Relations; Arms Sales To Iraq; Training Of Iraqi Forces; Visit Of General Shenshal. Sale Of Military Equipment To The Iraq Government. 30 May 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/889. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107456052/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=7ac07a34&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.